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Summary 
A high-yield bond is a financing option for a non-investment grade 
corporation, enabling it to raise funds on the capital market. In light of 
harsher conditions for senior financing, the development of a liquid high-
yield market for bonds may prove a necessary way forward to ensure global 
competitiveness for Swedish small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) 
that typically relies heavily on bilateral- and syndicated bank loans.  
 
The reasons behind issuing a bond instead of turning to senior financing 
alternatives or stock issuances vary, but usually it is a combination of 
factors concerning price, control and flexibility. As the owner of notes in a 
bond, i.e., a long-term, tradable debt, you are eligible to annual 
remuneration: every year until the bond maturity date, you collect interest. 
Upon the bond’s maturity, you will collect the value of your investment, 
known as the principal. Due to the lack of controlling rights accompanied 
with holding debt securities such as bonds, compared to owning shares, 
investors wish to employ a method for mitigating their risks towards the 
issuer. Predominantly, this need is accommodated through the usage of 
covenants.  
 
Complex covenant packages are often influential in dictating the terms and 
conditions of the facilities agreements governing bonds. For many investors, 
which covenants to employ may be hard to determine. This factor, 
combined with the need to tailor covenant packages to suit each specific 
loan agreement, has led to contrasting covenant practices within the 
Swedish high-yield bond sector. This is evidently supported by this study, 
and is in part believed to be a result of the fact that the standardized loan 
agreements that have evolved in the Swedish high-yield bond sector have 
yet to encompass covenants to any extent. Therefore, this study sets out to 
map the covenant practices on the Swedish market, including how 
covenants are drafted in each separate case, thus ascertaining their value for 
the investor. This objective is accomplished by comparing theoretical 
purposes behind covenants in loan agreements—derivative of doctrine 
within financial law—with the actual wording of the clauses employed in 
agreements within the scope of an empirical survey that has been carried 
out. In this process, some legal pitfalls were identified, possibly leading to 
diverging results when comparing the purposes behind employing a 
covenant with the implication in practice.  
 
The main diverging aspects between purpose and practice were found in 
negative pledge-covenants—due to their apparent lack of effect towards 
third parties under Swedish law—and within no-disposal clauses’ and no-
merger clauses’ function due to the usage of the vague term material 
adverse effect as an outer limit for the covenants’ applicability. Certain 
issues related to basket sizes and specific carve-outs were also recognized.   
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For the most part, the majority of covenants investigated did however seem 
to provide lenders with the level of protection that was pursued. This means 
that the theory and practice of most covenants corresponded. Hence, it is 
concluded that the purpose behind covenants as the carrier of effective 
enforcement rights against the borrower is fulfilled, even though some 
possible limitations of a few covenant clauses’ legal effect were in fact 
identified. This conclusion was held by adapting a pragmatic and rational 
view of covenant practices—not neglecting the power that is vested in the 
noteholders to accelerate premature payment of the notes (should an event 
of default under the facility agreement occur)—rather than strictly 
scrutinizing covenants’ effects under the law. 
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Sammanfattning 
En högriskobligation, eller företagsobligation med hög risk, är ett sätt för ett 
litet eller medelstort företag med låg kreditvärdighet att anskaffa pengar på 
kapitalmarknaden. I takt med att hårdare krav ställs på seniora långivare så 
växer betydelsen av en välutvecklad marknad för högriskobligationer i 
Sverige. Detta är nödvändigt för att bibehålla en global konkurrenskraft hos 
svenska små- och medelstora företag som ofta är starkt beroende av 
bilaterala- och syndikerade banklån. 
  
Anledningarna till att ett företag väljer att ge ut obligationer i stället för att 
uppta seniora banklån eller att ge ut aktier varierar, men är vanligtvis 
beroende av faktorer såsom pris, kontroll och flexibilitet. En obligation är 
ett långvarigt, omsättningsbart lån. Ägaren av obligationen är berättigad till 
årlig ersättning i form av ränta som periodvis betalas fram till obligationens 
förfallodag. På förfallodagen betalas även obligationens principalsumma ut. 
Eftersom obligationsinnehavaren likt andra kreditgivare saknar det 
inflytande över bolaget som innehas av aktieägare så måste andra metoder 
användas för att reglera riskerna förknippade med kreditgivningen. Detta 
görs primärt genom användandet av covenanter i låneavtalen. 
 
Komplicerade covenantpaket har ofta en stark inverkan på hur 
obligationernas avtalsvillkor ser ut i sin helhet. För många investerare är 
frågan vilka covenanter som ska användas svår att avgöra. Denna faktor, i 
kombination med behovet att kunna skräddarsy vilka covenanter som ska 
användas till varje specifikt låneavtal, har lett till en kontrasterande 
användning av covenanter på den svenska marknaden för 
högriskobligationer. Detta styrks av denna studie, och antas delvis bero på 
det faktum att det standardavtal som har utvecklats för den svenska 
högriskobligationsmarknaden inte innefattar covenanter. Det är i bakgrund 
av detta som denna studie avser att kartlägga hur covenanter används på den 
svenska marknaden, inbegripande deras ordalydelse i varje enskilt fall. 
Därigenom finns en förhoppning att kunna utröna det praktiska värdet av 
dem för obligationsinnehavare. Detta mål uppnås genom att jämföra det 
teoretiska syftet som finns bakom olika covenanter, enligt relevant doktrin 
inom finansiell rätt, med covenanters ordalydelse såsom de är utformade i 
de låneavtal som är del av den empiriska undersökning som uppsatsen 
bygger på. Denna process ledde till att flera legala fallgropar kunde 
identifieras, som tänkbart kan leda till skillnader i resultat vid en jämförelse 
av covenanters bakomliggande syfte och det syfte de får i praktiken.  
 
De primärt åtskiljande faktorerna mellan det bakomliggande syftet och den 
antagna praktiska implikationen fanns vid användandet av negative pledge-
covenanter – på grund av deras till synes avsaknad av effekt gentemot 
tredjemän i svensk rätt – och i covenanter som avser att begränsa 
låntagarens förfoganderätt över bolagets egendom, samt i covenanter som 
avser att begränsa sammanslagning eller uppdelning av det. I det senare 
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fallet argumenteras det att anledningen till detta är användandet av 
terminologin material adverse effect som en yttre gräns för covenanternas 
tillämplighet. Vissa möjligt åtskiljande faktorer mellan syfte och praktik 
identifierades även vid användandet av vissa basketbelopp samt carve-outs. 
 
Sammantaget konkluderas det dock att majoriteten av covenanterna i 
studien ger investerare det skydd som är avsett. Detta innebär att syftet 
bakom covenanter korresponderar med den praktiska innebörden de antas få 
vid sin tillämpning. Således dras slutsatsen att covenanternas roll som ett 
effektivt påtryckningsmedel gentemot låntagaren uppnås, trots att vissa 
begränsningar i ett fåtal covenanters legala värde de facto kunde urskiljas. I 
stället för att strikt analysera varje covenants legala tillämplighet har denna 
slutsats dragits genom att anta ett pragmatiskt och rationellt synsätt av hur 
covenanter används – utan att försumma den befogenhet som 
obligationsinnehavarna besitter när det kommer till att accelerera betalning 
av obligationerna i förtid för det fall att ett covenantbrott i enlighet med 
avtalsvillkoren inträffar. 
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Abbreviations  
DCM Debt Capital Market 
 
LTV Loan To Value 
 
MAC Material Adverse Change 
 
MAE Material Adverse Effect 
 
SME  Small- and medium-sized enterprise 
 
SSDA Swedish Securities Dealers Association 
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Definitions 
Basket  A term for a maximum amount for a specific 
exception to a covenant restriction in a loan 
agreement. If a loan agreement limits the 
borrowers ability to incur additional debt, unless 
it is below SEK 5 million, then the 5 million is 
considered a debt-basket.2 
 
Carve-out  An exception to a covenant’s applicability in a 
loan agreement. For example, if a covenant limits 
the borrower from disposing of company assets, 
a carve-out would permit the latter to sell 
property at a fair market value, or to sell property 
that is obsolete.3  
 
 
                                                
2 Compare with Practical Law, Glossary Item (http://us.practicallaw.com/1-382-3264). 
3 Compare with Practical Law, Glossary Item (http://us.practicallaw.com/0-382-
3311?q=carve-out). 
 10 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
It is unlikely that anyone with insight into the field of Sweden’s debt capital 
market (“DCM”) will have missed the past few years’ market trend of non-
investment grade corporations issuing high-yield bonds. Despite the trend 
being on an uprising, the market is immensely underdeveloped compared to 
other countries.4 The need for improvement is by some claimed to be 
abundant, not only to ensure that the stream of capital to Swedish 
corporations is maintained in spite of possible regulatory actions—but also 
to broaden the scope of financing options for non-investment grade 
corporations. It is believed that the high-yield bond will play a crucial role 
in accomplishing these objectives. 
 
One feature in facilitating for an expansion of the market lies in improving 
methods of ensuring investors that their capital is safeguarded, thereby 
increasing their incentive to invest. A key aspect in managing this protection 
is to improve the usage of covenants in bond terms. To date, little interest 
has been shown in covenants in high-yield bond terms amongst legal 
scholars. Even so, the concept of covenants is nothing new; it is probable 
that covenants of some sort have been employed for as long as there has 
been a DCM. With time, covenant packages designed for certain securities 
have evolved in light of experiences held by credit providers—resulting in a 
creation of standards tied to the instrument to which the covenant is 
connected to. Since the Swedish high-yield bond market is underdeveloped, 
it is my belief that it would be beneficial to examine covenant terms of 
bonds on this market, with the overall objective to find out what might be of 
importance for an investor’s purpose to protect her investment. In the 
process, I hope that some interesting conclusions will be held as regards the 
legal implication of certain covenants, in the interest of legal practitioners- 
and scholars alike.  
 
The need for transparency should also be viewed in light of the lack of 
covenant coverage within the standardized loan agreement template 
constructed by the Swedish Securities Dealers Association (“SSDA”), 
which is utilized for senior unsecured-/senior secured-/subordinated notes 
with either floating or fixed interest rates.5 Even though it needs to be 
understood that uniformed practices is undesired and impossible to enforce 
(since each covenant package needs to be tailored to a specific loan 
agreement), it may be stated that efforts resulting in covenants being given 
too deviating contents due to diligent usage of carve-outs, baskets and 
                                                
4 Barr, Daniel, Den svenska företagsobligationsmarknaden – en förstudie, September 2011, 
p. 6. [cit. Barr]. 
5 Compare with the Swedish Securities Dealers Association’s template, Terms and 
conditions for [Senior Unsecured/Senior Secured/Subordinated] [Fixed/Floating] Rate 
Notes, version 1.0, dated 29 May 2013. 
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general limitations in the clauses’ application is detrimental to the investor. 
In ascertaining whether material differences are at hand, I decided to 
broadly compare the content of bond terms within the Swedish high-yield 
bond sector.  
1.2 Purpose and theses 
Inherent in providing credit is a measure of risk. This must be true, for 
virtually all loan agreements contain either obligations imposed on the 
debtor, restrictions imposed on the debtor—or more commonly—the two 
combined. Only some risks associated with providing credit are mitigated 
by legislation, for example by providing creditors with insolvency law, as 
well as the ability to hold security is assets of the debtor with binding 
proprietary rights. Instead, most risk-mitigating efforts are utilized on a 
contractual basis, enabling for more flexibility and control.  
 
The aim for this study is to investigate how investors in high-yield bonds 
use covenants to protect their investment. To answer this question, I will 
conduct an empirical study aimed to investigate which covenants are most 
frequently employed in the loan agreements of the bonds within the 
scope6—and then account for their wording (since the value for the investor 
depends on the wording of each covenant). The results of the analysis of 
covenant contents will display the practical implications of covenants within 
the Swedish high-yield bond sector. These practical implications will then 
be compared with how the same kinds of covenants are used in loan 
agreements on a more general level, according to literature within financial 
law. This comparative test will display how well covenants serve their 
purpose as they are used in the bonds within the scope. 
 
Consequently, this paper will analyse the following question: 
 
How are covenants used in loan agreements of Swedish high-yield bonds, 
and how well do they serve their intended purpose? 
 
(Purpose is understood as meaning to ensure maximum rate of return on the 
lender’s investment as opposed to, inter alia, offering the borrower 
flexibility and rights to self-determination). 
 
In order to analyse this question, I will need to investigate the following 
issues:  
 
(i) What is the hypothetical purpose behind employing different 
covenants in loan agreements? 
(ii) Does these purposes correspond to the legal implications of each 
covenant in practice? (Where the legal implication in practice 
means the wording of each covenant, as identified in the empirical 
                                                
6 See infra at section 1.3. 
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study, subject to my interpretation made in accordance with the 
parties’ will). 
(iii) If they do not, which risks are incurred as a result of these 
deviations in implication, and  
(iv) how can these risks be mitigated? 
 
The SSDA benchmark template has been frequently used in the drafting of 
Swedish high-yield bond terms, displayed by the results of the empirical 
study. When studying the terms of the template, it is apparent that most 
areas are covered except for covenants imposed on the borrower (and 
consequently, what constitutes an event of the default under the notes since 
this is dependent on which restrictions are in fact imposed). The question 
that arises is whether it would be possible, or even beneficial, to incorporate 
covenant features in the standard loan agreement to some or any extent. The 
paper will provide a brief discussion as regards this subject. 
 
Another reason for me writing this paper is that I wish to learn more about 
how risk-mitigating efforts are utilized by creditors in loan agreements, both 
on a general- and specific level—whereas the specific level consists of 
understanding and accounting for the complicated mechanisms in 
covenants. For this purpose, the high-yield bond loan agreement is a suitable 
platform. I also chose this subject due to my interest within the field, and 
since the phenomenon of high-yield bonds is new in Sweden, meaning that 
conformed usages of covenant standards have yet to evolve. 
 
Included in the purpose is also my will not only to learn about this topic, but 
also my desire to shed some light on the high-yield bond as a viable 
financing option. This is because I believe that efforts will need to be made 
in the future to improve the transparency and liquidity of the Swedish 
market, thereby enhancing Swedish non-investment grade corporations’ 
abilities to raise external capital. In light of coming trials, this may be an 
important aspect of maintaining the competitive edge of our SMEs on a 
global level. I do not anticipate that this paper will facilitate greatly in 
achieving this objective, but perhaps it will be of some value to anyone with 
interest in high-yield bond terms. Moreover, this subject is in parity with my 
will to write about something that is practically oriented, since I feel that 
this is a welcome addition to an education with few compulsory practical 
elements. 
1.3 Scope 
Whereas there are different kinds of bonds, the base of this study is limited 
to Swedish high-yield bonds. For the purpose herein, this means: 
 
(i) Bonds that are, or have been, outstanding on the Swedish market, 
with credit rating lower than investment grade; 
(ii) with agent7;  
                                                
7 See infra p. 13. 
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(iii) with first issue date no later than the 30th of October 2013; and 
(iv) with terms and conditions available for download via one of the 
agents’ websites. 
 
These delimitation factors narrowed down the scope of the empirical survey 
to 38 different indentures (as listed under Supplement A). 
 
To the extent possible, I have tried to narrow down the scope of this paper 
to deal with the contents of the contract that is entered into between the 
noteholders of a bond, and the issuer. However, the reader will need to have 
certain knowledge about the theory behind corporate finance to be able to 
understand the reasons behind taking risk-mitigating measures in credit 
agreements. As such, the reader will have to bear with some financial 
paraphernalia. 
 
Reducing the scope further is the limitation in covering legal proceedings 
following issuers’ insolvency. There will only be brief points of contact. 
The same applies to general aspects of breaches of contract under Swedish 
law. Moreover, this study will not describe the monitoring role prescribed to 
the agent or trustee of Swedish high-yield bonds. This is mainly because it 
has already been covered.8 For the purpose of this paper, the reader only 
needs to have basic understanding of this role, which, inter alia, involves 
acting on behalf of the bondholder collective against the issuer in situations 
where breaches of bond terms have occurred, (where the objective is to 
rationalize monitoring, since it is ineffective for creditors to monitor 
themselves, and the outsourced monitoring function makes it more attractive 
for investors to invest), to hold security (if there is any), and represent the 
noteholders’ general interests against the borrower.  
 
There are certain additional factors of risk that investors should bear in mind 
when it comes to Swedish high-yield bonds, besides those associated with 
covenants. Albeit it would be a suitable complement to this paper, these 
risks will not be accounted for since it would make this depiction far too 
incoherent and drawn-out. In short, these risks consist of certain procedural 
risks associated with the function of the trustee under Swedish law,9 
                                                
8 For example in the master’s thesis “En trustee på den svenska finansmarknaden – 
problem och framtid” written by Isac Outinen and Joakim Forsberg (Faculty of Law, 
University of Stockholm, 2012).   
9 High-yield bond facilities agreements often contain a so-called no-action-, or no-petition 
clause. The purpose is to prevent individual noteholders from taking action against the 
borrower, thus facilitating the trustee’s monitoring of the issuer and the latter’s abilities to 
take legal action on behalf of the bondholder collective—without interference from 
individual noteholders. The validity of these clauses is subject to question, especially as 
regards if it causes inadmissibility and results in rejection (sw. avvisning). Moreover, in 
light of the “trustee’s” legal authorization to act on behalf of the bondholder collective in 
court, some aspects are questionable. This is since the legal institute is not acknowledged 
under Swedish law (in jurisdictions where the trust is recognized, the trustee has the ability 
to take action on behalf of the bondholders on its own account). It is contemplated that the 
“trustee” under Swedish law will have to take action on the bondholder’s account, either by 
acting in its own name as a party in the proceedings, or in the name of the bondholders via 
power of attorney from each bondholder (compare with The Swedish Code of Judicial 
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uncertainties as regards how noteholders in majority can legally bind the 
minority10 and concerns associated with exit-consents because of this 
majority-binding-minority-conundrum.11 
1.4 Method 
I have used several methods during the course of writing this paper. In order 
to approach the subject of covenant usages on the Swedish high-yield bond 
market, I examined the terms and conditions of the loan agreements of all of 
the bonds within the scope. The covenants most frequently occurring were 
then established. I then examined the wording of each of these covenants if 
they were part of the facilities agreement of each respective bond. In the 
matrix created as a result of this research, the key aspects of each covenant’s 
contents were gathered. This method of attaining knowledge about a subject 
by carrying out observations should appropriately be called empirical.   
 
In the process of making the initial selection of covenants to have as a basis 
to test against, I consulted practitioners. However, due to the 
inconclusiveness of interviews for the purpose of methodical and scientific 
formations of theory, I combined the comprehensions I acquired thereby 
with my own belief of which covenants should be of importance for 
investors. 
 
As regards the analytical parts concerning the legal implications of certain 
covenants, the method that has been applied has been legal dogmatic. I 
define this method as acquiring all relevant legal information on a subject, 
in a first step (with relevant sources subject to an internal ranking system; 
the law is the primary source, followed by preparatory works, case law, and 
doctrine, in order of relevance). In the second step, the relevant sources are 
applied to the legal question. This application mainly entails an 
interpretation of the sources from different perspectives. In the third step, 
arguments are made as regards the correctness of the selected sources and 
the accuracy of their interpretation. Since this is a subject including very 
practical and few scholarly aspects, I have given the term “doctrine” a wide 
                                                                                                                        
Procedure chapter 12, section 2, 13 and 8, as well as chapter 34 section 1. For further 
reading, see Wieslander, Magnus, Om avtal om talerätt och taleförbud på 
företagsobligationsmarknaden i Sverige, Juridisk Publikation, second issue, 2012. 
10 For further reading, see Wood, Philip, Law and Practice of International Finance, 
University Edition, Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd., 2008. p. 185 et seq. [cit. 
Wood.] 
11 Exit consents are universally used in bond restructurings where a debtor wants to change 
the debt profile, its maturity, or replace expensive debt with cheaper debt. The debtor 
invites noteholders to exchange the bonds that are held given that they commit to vote in 
favour of resolutions to amend the debt profile, maturity, etc. If these resolutions are later 
carried out, minority bondholders who refuse to accept the offer will be left with notes that 
are worth considerably less than the ones they initially held. Exit consents are therefore 
perceived as incentivizing noteholders who try to hold out in negotiations. Compare with 
White & Case, Bond exit consents: No way out?, PLC Magazine, Practical Law Publishing 
Ltd., September 2012. 
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meaning—thereby including reports and publications of banks, law firms 
and alike.  
1.5 Material 
Swedish legal literature has not, to my knowledge, covered any aspects of 
covenants in loan agreements. In a global perspective, however, relevant 
literature is not hard to find. By many standards, the work of author Philip 
Wood is considered to be the benchmark within financial law. His book 
“Law and Practice of International Finance” has therefore been crucial for 
this paper. The significance of Wood’s doctrine for the sake of Swedish law 
is questionable at first, but since the law and practice of international 
finance in Sweden is very much affected by practices in Anglo-Saxon 
jurisdictions—especially what goes on in London—it becomes significantly 
more applicable. The object of the book is “[T]o cover the entire scope of 
international finance and to do so on a comparative and world-wide 
basis”12. Moreover, the freedom of contract applies to how loan agreements 
are drafted. As such, the theory and principles behind covenants and 
undertakings in international bonds shall also apply on bonds issued in 
Sweden.  
 
The focus on the work of Wood does inevitably lead to the fact that the 
objectiveness of this paper may be questioned in light of the lack of the 
variation in sources. However, since the empirical study and comparison of 
the facilities agreements will comprise the most important part of this paper, 
the objectiveness in doctrine is in my opinion not considered a problem.   
1.6 Disposition 
This paper starts with a theoretical chapter, aimed to provide the reader with 
background information necessary for understanding why there is a need for 
credit providers to impose restrictions on the debtor’s rights to self-
determination. To illustrate, I have compared the rights conferred in 
creditors in debt with those of shareholders, who are more rigorously 
protected due to company legislation. 
 
The third chapter will begin with an account for what the literature has to 
say about covenants in loan agreements. The purpose with the section is to 
shed light on the underlying purposes behind covenants and the reasons why 
they are employed. After the general purposes have been established, these 
will be compared to the results of the empirical study—i.e. the covenants’ 
practical implication. The fourth and analytical chapter will drill down into 
the most apparent and disputable aspects of the difference between covenant 
usages in theory, and the implication of covenants as they are employed in 
Swedish high-yield bonds. The results will then be pragmatically 
summarized in the fifth and last chapter. 
                                                
12 Wood, (preface).  
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2 The fundamentals of 
corporate finance 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to explain why credit providers need to impose 
restrictions on the flexibility of the debtor by incorporating covenants in 
loan agreements. It is my belief that a brief overview of the reasons behind 
this is necessary for the reader’s understanding of the mechanisms behind 
covenants. For illustrative purposes, I will approach the subject by having 
the shareholder acting as a comparison in showing how rights and 
obligations differ between providers of equity- and debt capital. 
 
To get to the bottom of the topic of protecting provided capital, the reader 
needs to know what makes the corporate form uniquely attractive when it 
comes to conducting organized productive activity, and—as a 
consequence—why it is able to attract different kinds of investments. Bonds 
are only a part of a major spectrum of ways to raise capital, but the 
underlying principle is the same as with any investment. You, as an 
investor, would like to put your capital to use and, as a result, increase its 
value. In doing this, you probably wish to limit your risks to the extent 
possible, whilst still maintaining optimal growth capacities for your money. 
For the corporation that is in need of an influx of cash, the situation ought to 
be the opposite: to give up as little rights as possible and still keep 
remuneration levels low. 
2.2 The uniqueness of the corporate form 
The influx of capital to corporations’ financing structures is multi-faceted. 
Therefore, to understand certain aspects of corporate finance, one needs to 
have basic knowledge of some key legal features of the corporation. 
Leading scholars have agreed on five of them: legal personality, limited 
liability, transferable shares, delegated management under a board structure, 
and investor ownership. This basic structure is true in practically all 
economically important jurisdictions across the globe.13 For the purpose of 
this paper, three of them are relevant.  
2.2.1 Legal personality 
A central part of the corporation is that it is a separate legal patrimony. The 
consequence of this function is dual: it enables for the creation of what is 
                                                
13 Kraakman, Reinier, Armour, John, Davies, Paul, Enriques, Luca, Hansmann, Henry, 
Hertig, Gerard, Hopt, Klaus, Kanda, Hideki and Rock, Edward, The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law – A Comparative and Functional Approach, second edition, Oxford University Press, 
2009, p. 5. [cit. Kraakman et al.].  
 17 
known as entity shielding, and it invokes a barrier of liquidation protection. 
The goal of entity shielding is to protect (or shield), the entity’s assets from 
the creditors of the group entitled to control the firm’s assets (effectively, 
the owners). The firm itself is viewed as the legal owner of these assets. 
This results in a very important outcome: the right of ownership gives the 
corporation rights to use the assets, to sell them, and—most importantly—to 
be able to attach them to its creditors. This also entails that the assets are 
unapproachable by the creditors of the firms’ owners, since they are 
considered as belonging to the corporation and therefore are unattainable for 
attachment in any other way.14  
 
From a legal point of view, the legal personality-character of the corporation 
implicates two matters of importance. On the one hand, a priority rule 
granting the corporation’s creditors, as security for its debts, a priority claim 
on the firm’s assets prior to those claims of the personal creditors of the 
firm’s owners.15 This emphasizes the separated legal personality of the 
corporation by setting apart assets and, in turn, allows for far more effective 
monitoring abilities for company creditors.16 The second part is that of 
liquidation protection. This attribute provides for a set of rules with the 
combined target of preventing the dissolution of a firm’s going concern 
value. Thus—by preventing shareholders from withdrawing their shares in 
the firm at any time—liquidation, either in part or in full, is impossible. 
Neither can the personal creditors of a shareholder take control of the 
shareholder’s firm assets. Hence, the liquidation protection rule protects the 
firm’s going concern value against both shareholders and creditors of 
shareholders.17 
2.2.2 Limited liability 
Limited liability means that the liability of any person that invests in a 
corporation is limited to that of the original stake. If you pay a certain 
amount for a share, you only risk that amount. If you lend a certain amount, 
you only risk that amount. Regardless of the corporation’s actions, the 
liability will never exceed that of the original investment. Limited liability is 
unarguably hugely important. Absent this function, investors would perhaps 
be forced to supply unlimited amounts of additional capital to struggling 
businesses. Well-off investors would hesitantly buy shares since all of their 
personal assets would be risked. To mitigate these risks, it is quite likely that 
any (wealthy) investor would heavily reduce the number of corporations 
invested in, and conduct stringent observing of each company’s 
undertakings.18 This would act detrimental to the abilities for firms to raise 
capital.   
                                                
14 Kraakman et al., p. 6. 
15 Kraakman et al., p. 7. 
16 Skeel, David A., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, Yale Law Journal, May 2004, p. 5. [cit. 
Skeel.]. 
17 Kraakman et al., p. 7.  
18 Easterbrook, Frank H., Limited Liability and the Corporation, University of Chicago 
Law Review, 1985, p. 1 et seq. [cit. Easterbrook].  
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Henry Hansmann formed the term owner shielding, which is what limited 
liability sometimes is called. Owner shielding is the adverse of entity 
shielding. It means that creditors only have the ability to make claims 
towards the firm’s assets, and not towards assets held by the shareholders 
themselves. Owner shielding and entity shielding—together and in 
conjunction—create asset partitioning. The implication is that assets 
belonging to the firm are pledged as security to firm creditors, whereas 
business owners’ own assets are reserved for their personal creditors.19  
2.2.3 Investor ownership  
Two notable aspects arise out of the term investor ownership: the owner’s 
right to control the firm and the owner’s right to receive dividends from the 
corporation’s net profit. Controlling rights typically means the right to 
appoint directors (or remove them), and vote prior to major corporate 
events. The entitlement to take part of dividends means remuneration 
derived from firm earnings; typically paid at a certain amount per share. The 
amount of capital that is contributed to the firm (i.e. the amount invested in 
shares of the company) is in relation to the rights that are given.20 I think 
that the term investor ownership exemplifies the difference between 
investing in equity, compared to debt. Debt investors lack voting rights, and 
instead this right is conferred by the usage of covenants and other 
undertakings given by the issuer.  
 
The three characteristics of the corporation discussed directly above are 
central for understanding corporate finance as a whole. It is inter alias due 
to these elements that debt capital providers wish to employ certain 
measures to marshal their investment by means of contract. This is where 
the covenants enter the picture. With that in mind, it is time to broadly 
approach the topic of firms’ business of acquiring long-term financing. 
2.3 Capital structures 
From a very wide perspective, there are two types of financing options: 
funds generated by the operations of the company and funds obtained from 
outside providers. The latter can consist of either equity- or debt capital. A 
firm’s ability to raise capital—equity as well as debt—depends largely upon 
its profitability. Certainly, there is an ideal capital structure for every 
business model and every phase of a corporation’s growth. For many firms, 
bank loans may be the single most attractive option. That does not however 
apply to all. A basic principle is that a portion of equity needs to be 
incorporated into the financial structure, to make up for increased business 
risks, thereby catching the effects of unanticipated setbacks of the 
                                                
19 Kraakman et al., p. 10. 
20 Kraakman et al., p. 14.  
 19 
business.21 Equity is compulsory in a limited liability company’s financing 
structure. Besides the minimal capital requirements stipulated in the 
Swedish Companies Act (SFS 2005:551)22 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Companies Act”), companies also have the ability to emit shares in 
accordance with the rules set out in Chapter 13 of the Companies Act.  
 
As familiar, a firm is owned by its shareholders. This ownership means 
entitlement to cash-flow rights, as well as controlling rights.23 Financing by 
issuing equity (in excess of the equity raised at the time of the creation of 
the company) means that the current shareholders’ ownership is diluted, 
thus decreasing their controlling rights. Issuing equity is also reserved for 
larger corporations with access to the capital markets, and the process is 
rather expensive.24 It may also be stated that it is inefficient for a 
corporation to be financed solely by equity. Dual reasons account for that: 
the incorporation of debt enables equity holders to leverage their original 
stake, and more importantly, debt is inexpensive compared to equity.25 
These factors create incentive for corporations to acquire debt.  
 
Different types of debt securities held by an investor can be categorized in 
several ways. Either, by being recognized by their cash flows, or by defining 
the rights their holders are conferred with by their respective ownership. 
Applied to the equity- and debt perspective, the cash flow granted by 
holding debt is a fixed stream of interest payments, compared to the equity 
holder’s rights to dividends derivative of the company’s net earnings. When 
comparing which rights the securities entitle their holders, shares give the 
owner appointment- or removal rights, whereas debt gives creditors the 
power to repossess assets if the debtor fails payment. These rights are of 
central meaning when it comes to assessing and mitigating the risk of 
managerial decision-making in self-interest. Shareholders are entitled to 
dividends due to their ability to vote out directors who do not pay them. 
Creditors are paid because they have the right to repossess collateral. Absent 
these rights, investors would reluctantly invest in a corporation. Therefore, 
their existence is crucial to the influx of capital to businesses.26   
 
External capital usually consists of one of two different kinds of bank loans: 
either a term loan, or a promissory note loan (sw. reverslån). A term loan is 
a loan for a fixed term (or period) that is cancellable only upon the 
fulfilment of certain specified conditions. Usually, premature payment is 
only possible if an event of default or certain other events have occurred. 
                                                
21 Credit Suisse, Mezzanine Finance – A Hybrid Instrument with a Future, Economic 
Briefing (no. 42) Zurich, 2005, p. 4. [Cit. Credit Suisse]. 
22 Chapter 1, section 5. 
23 Compare with the Swedish Companies Act, inter alia, chapter 7, 8 and 18. 
24 Sandström, Torsten, Svensk aktiebolagsrätt, fourth edition, Norstedts Juridik AB, 2012, 
p. 102. [cit. Sandström]. 
25 Because the interest paid to service the loan is tax-deductible, compared to dividends that 
are paid out of taxed income.  
26La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Schleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W, 
Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, The University of Chicago, 1998, p. 1113 
et seq. [cit. La Porta et al.] 
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The loan contract is usually very straightforward; the lender advances credit 
to a debtor, who undertakes to pay it back and in the meantime pay interest 
at an agreed rate. What tend to complicate things are the rather enormous 
amounts involved.27 The other principal form of debt, the promissory note 
loan, advances to the debtor a sum of money from the creditor, subject to 
specific terms in the loan agreement that is entered into by the parties 
involved. The term is not set, but there is usually a final maturity date.28  
 
The Companies Act does not interfere with a corporation’s ability to acquire 
capital by lending, as long as the formal decision is made in accordance 
with the framework of the law.29 The result of a loan is that a bank that has 
entered into an agreement with a firm gets a contractual right to its cash-
flow (even though the residual cash-flow rights are still left to the 
shareholder). In order for the bank to try to protect its investment, it is quite 
likely that it imposes a set of constraints on the firm’s actions and 
undertakings. A comprehensive grid of restraints is however impossible to 
create; the operating- and investment decisions still lies with the 
shareholders.30 There are two main characteristics of a loan: the issuing 
corporation is required to pay interest on the loan during the time until its 
maturity, and upon maturity, redeem the principal. The second feature is that 
the creditor may—in conjunction with other creditors—redeem its claim 
upon the liquidation or bankruptcy of the debtor. For the shareholder’s 
concern, the situation is quite the opposite. Dividends are only paid when 
the corporation is profitable (and when the company approves them).31  
 
Banks’ offering of capital to corporations is regulated in the Banking and 
Financing Business Act (SFS 2004:297).32 The element of risk associated 
with providing capital to a business is usually mitigated with the holding of 
collateral, enabling the creditor to limit his financial exposure towards the 
debtor by having his debt secured in real assets.33 As far as the law is 
concerned, however, no such demand is mandatory. Instead, aforementioned 
law only requires that “Before a credit institution decides to grant a loan, it 
shall assess the risk that the obligations under the loan agreement cannot be 
performed. The institution may grant a loan only where there exist sound 
reasons to anticipate that the obligations will be performed.”34 
 
Consequently, a loan agreement is not subject to anything but the parties’ 
autonomy as regards requirements for securitization. This entails that it can 
be negotiated in accordance with the will and negotiating leverage of the 
parties. Holding collateral offers creditors a sense of security, should the 
                                                
27 Wood, p. 93.  
28 Lennander, Gertrud, Kredit och säkerhet, tenth edition, 2011, p. 19 et seq. [cit. 
Lennander]. 
29 Compare with chapter 8, section 29, 35, 36 and 42 of the Swedish Companies Act 
(however, consider the indirect effect of the rules in chapter 25). 
30 Since it is the shareholders that control the firm. 
31 Skog, Rolf, Rodhes Aktiebolagsrätt, twenty-third issue, 2011, p. 74 et seq. [cit. Skog]. 
32 Lennander, p. 13. 
33 Lennander, p. 15 et seq. 
34 Banking and Financing Business Act (SFS 2004:297), chapter 8, section 1.  
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debtor end up in default. This is because of the primary issue in a 
bankruptcy that all creditor claims cannot be accommodated. If all creditor 
claims could be accommodated, the debtor would not have been declared 
bankrupt to begin with, since then he is not insolvent.35 After assets that 
belong to others than the debtor have been separated from the estate and the 
costs associated with the bankruptcy have been settled, the remainder is to 
be divided.36 A fundamental principle in bankruptcy is that all creditors 
shall have equal right: meaning that they shall be proportionally paid from 
the remainder of the bankruptcy estate’s assets in accordance with the 
proportion of their claim. This concept is derivative from provisions 1 and 
18 of the Rights of Priority Act (SFS 1970:979). The principle of equal right 
is thus not absolute, with the right of priority as an exception. There are two 
types of priority rights: specific priority rights, for example attached to 
particular collateral, and general property rights, attached to all the assets in 
the bankruptcy estate. In short, this means that a creditor who holds 
collateral in an asset has the ability to get full reimbursement of his claim, 
derived from the realization of the asset (using the proceeds as payment), 
prior to other creditors.37 Hence, the creditor who holds collateral in the 
asset is prioritized against other creditors upon default of the debtor.38 
 
Corporations may acquire external capital 
under specific conditions. For example, a 
creditor’s claim may be designed to 
provide the creditor with lesser rights, 
making the loan subordinated in relation 
to other creditors. Such a loan is secondary 
in right to receive principal as well as 
interest upon the debtor’s liquidation or 
bankruptcy.39 The higher the standing, the 
greater is the opportunity to receive 
dividends from the allocation of realized 
values upon the debtor’s default.40 
Whereas holding pure equity in a 
corporation is associated with the highest level of risk, holding secured debt 
is associated with the lowest. This entails that there is a correlation between 
risk and reward. Since equity capital is unsecured, an investor (shareholder) 
is generally given the right to vote or rights to receive dividends from the 
corporation’s net profit, as has been discussed. Creditors who provide 
financing in debt—which is not associated with ownership rights and is 
inter alia negatively affected by the concept of limited liability—have other 
                                                
35 Håstad, Torgny, Sakrätt avseende lös egendom, sixth edition 1996, with supplement from 
March 2000, Norstedts Juridik AB, p. 123. [cit. Håstad]. 
36 The Bankruptcy Act chapter 11, section 1.  
37 Håstad, p. 124 et seq. 
38 Lennander p. 78. 
39 Skog, p. 76. 
40 Danske Bank, Företagsobligationer, En guide till svenska investeringsmöjligheter, 
September 2013. p. 7. [cit. Danske Bank]. 
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incentives to put up capital. They are remunerated in interest and may have 
their loans secured in collateral.41  
2.3.1 Bonds 
In basic jargon, a bond is a tradable debt instrument. It is one of the 
principal forms of long-term debt, and its issuers range from governments to 
smaller corporations. The issuer is the debtor, and the holder of the bond is 
the creditor.42 The simple difference between a bond and a loan is that the 
bond is a tradable loan. In total, the value of bonds in issue today accounts 
for about $40 trillion, making the bond market amongst the largest financial 
markets of the world.43  
 
A bond is substantiated by transferable securities that have been issued by a 
borrower to initial lenders. The first step in the process of issuing a bond is 
normally carried out by an issuing agent (typically an investment bank) that 
enters into an agreement with the issuer to procure subscribers for the 
indenture. This process is managed by circulating a prospectus containing 
information about the issuer, and the specifics of the bond indenture. The 
securities are usually listed on a stock exchange, mainly to facilitate 
investments for companies whose capital placements are limited to those 
that are listed. As a result, the bonds are easily transferable. The interest rate 
that the notes carry is either floating, tied to an index, or fixed.44 
2.3.1.1 What makes a bond high-yield? 
The element of risk associated with investing in a bond differs greatly, 
depending on the results of a combined assessment of the issuing 
corporation. A key term for investors is yield; the interest a bond will pay as 
a function of its price. As such, high-yield bonds pay a high interest rate in 
relation to their market price. The principal reason for a high-yield label is 
that the issuer’s credit rating is below investment grade (BB+ or Ba1), 
which is approximately in the middle of a 22-grade scale, or that the issuer 
lacks a credit rating altogether. There are three players that dominate the 
rating sector: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. Their concept of 
rating a corporation’s credit worthiness is a process of weighing together the 
combined risks of the issuers’ business, financially as well as commercially. 
The overall assessment leads to a formal grade. Usually, a line is drawn 
between bonds that carry the label investment grade and the label high yield. 
The assessment is designed to reflect the risk of an issuer’s suspension of 
payment as per the terms of the loan agreement. Standard & Poor’s as well 
as Fitch draw the line at BB+, whereas Moody’s call it Ba1.45  
 
                                                
41 La Porta et al. p. 1114. 
42 Lennander, p. 100. 
43 Stoakes, Christopher, Know the City, first edition, 2013, p. 14 et seq. [cit. Stoakes]. 
44 Wood, p. 159 et seq. 
45 Danske Bank, p. 4 et seq.  
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2.3.1.2 The high-yield bond market in Sweden 
The corporate finance market in Sweden has traditionally been highly 
characterized by the dominant position of traditional bank loans in 
corporations’ financing structures. The main reasons for that include 
favourable pricing, and firmly established traditions within the Swedish 
commercial and industrial sphere.46 Statistics show that as of 2011, roughly 
80 per cent. of Swedish corporations relied on traditional bank loans as their 
method for debt financing. The single most important provider of capital 
was Swedish credit institutions.47 Swedish corporations have extended their 
loan-based financing considerably during the last 15 years, from roughly 
SEK 1000bn to SEK 2000bn.48  
 
Following the wake of the last financial crisis, European companies have 
started diversifying their debt structures by issuing bonds. This trend has 
also been apparent in Sweden; many corporations started to show interest in 
issuing bonds as a complement to more traditional debt a few years back. 
The year of 2009 showed a high number of Swedish issuances, especially 
ones denominated in foreign currency. Activity declined during 2010, but 
outstanding bonds (i.e. not only high-yield) by Swedish issuers still 
amounted to SEK 376bn. According to Bloomberg, about 70 issuers 
accounted for the total amount of outstanding bonds. Large, often global, 
corporate groups dominate this market.49 In 2010, the high-yield issuances 
by Swedish SMEs with credit ratings below investment grade amounted to 
only SEK 17,4bn.50  
 
The year of 2010 marked the inception of the high-yield bond phenomenon 
in Sweden. The proposed reasons to the growth that is seen in the segment is 
that companies see an increase in interest rates on their traditional bank 
loans, making bonds an attractive financing option.51 Increased 
opportunities to raise capital within the high-yield segment is anticipated to 
lead to more efficient allocation of capital, and better pricing of credit 
risks—thus allowing for Swedish SMEs to diversify their capital 
structures.52 Of further implication is regulatory actions aimed at ensuring 
banks’ solidity and liquidity lurking around the corner. By many, it is 
believed that this too will lead to a surge in the demand for viable options to 
more traditional debt financing. It is believed that the high-yield bond will 
become important to facilitate this demand for corporations lacking abilities 
to issue investment grade-instruments, and that find additional bank loans 
                                                
46 Gunnarsdottir, Gudrun and Lindh, Sofia, Marknader för svenska icke-finansiella företags 
lånebaserade finansiering, Penning- och valutapolitik, second issue, 2011, p. 31. [cit. 
Gunnarsdottir, Lindh].  
47 Statistics Sweden (sv: Statistiska Centralbyrån), where a “Swedish corporation” is 
defined as a non-financial corporation conducting business in Sweden. 
48 Barr, p. 5. 
49 Gunnarsdottir, Lindh, p. 34 et seq.  
50 Gunnarsdottir, Lindh, p. 36. 
51 Gunnarsdottir, Lindh, p. 36.  
52 Gunnarsdottir, Lindh, p. 27. 
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too costly an option (or simply not an option because of lack of collateral to 
pledge as security, or already too high leverage).  
2.4 Regulatory efforts possibly affecting 
the credit markets 
Regulatory efforts are winning ground in light of previous financial crises. It 
is quite possible that this will result in significant effects on the Swedish 
bond market.53  
2.4.1 Basel III 
The Basel III-regulatory global standard is set to be implemented from 2013 
to 2019. The standard entails stricter demands on banks as regards their 
capitalization and liquidity. The Swedish Central Bank concludes that the 
implementation of the directive may result in a growth of the high-yield 
bond market in Sweden, since companies may need to seek additional 
financiers. Swedish banks should not be affected to a great extent, largely 
due to their already high levels of capitalization. Foreign banks do 
nevertheless have a substantial role in about half of the syndicated loans 
offered to Swedish debtors. If foreign banks are affected by the new 
directive in a sense that they need to decrease the amount of lent capital to 
Swedish corporations, such dissension of bank syndicates will result in an 
increase in interest cost for borrowers. This, combined with the fact that 
Swedish banks in that case may face difficulties putting up more capital will 
mean that the market may stand before a subsequent change. These facts put 
together could result in an overall increase of the need to issue high-yield 
bonds.54 
2.4.2 MiFID and Solvency II 
The European Commission has proposed increased levels of transparency 
on the market for financial services by harmonizing market regulations. This 
objective is to be achieved by the implementation of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC). It is somewhat expected that 
these regulations will result in an increased activity on the Swedish bond 
market, even though opinions differ as regards the presumed positive 
effects.55 Moreover, the so-called Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) may 
be of interest as well. Aimed at regulating insurance companies’ ability to 
invest in certain assets, the directive will create incentive for insurance 
companies to invest in bonds with longer maturity. The Solvency II 
directive carries with it another aspect, namely incentive for insurance 
companies to diversify their asset stock. This could be achieved by investing 
in bonds with higher ratios of risk.56  
                                                
53 Barr, p. 9. 
54 The Swedish Central Bank, Finansiell stabilitet, 2010, second issue, p. 32. 
55 Gunnarsdottir, Lindh, p. 39 et seq.  
56 Barr, p. 9 et seq. 
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2.5 Closing remarks 
During the past few years, the market for bonds issued by Swedish 
corporations has, as mentioned, grown considerably. This is especially true 
for the high-yield segment. The market share of the high-yield segment is 
however quite insignificant in relative numbers and it is investment grade 
bonds that are prominent in Sweden. Game-changing regulatory actions in 
the pipeline may however cause material effect as regards the dominance of 
traditional bank debt in Swedish corporations’ balance sheets. This, in turn, 
will make it harder to attract senior, cheap, capital. The alternative is 
perhaps the high-yield bond. However, acting detrimental to the 
attractiveness is naturally the heightened element of risk for the investor due 
to the nature of these bonds, as aforementioned reasons show. This entails 
that the covenants given by the lender in the terms and conditions are of 
great importance; a statement that leads to the next chapter. 
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3 Covenants generally 
3.1 Introduction 
One important part of how debt capital providers protect their investment is 
the covenants made by the issuer in the terms and conditions of the bonds. 
Whereas the holder of equity shares has the right to control the firm and 
typically receive the firm’s net earnings, the debt capital provider—i.e. the 
lender—, has the same interest in the preservation of capital but possess 
none of the rights conferred in the equity holder. Debt holders do not have 
the right to vote, and no entitlement to dividends other than the agreed 
interest. The “vote” for creditors is therefore incurred by the usage of 
covenants.57 This chapter aims to drill down into the concept of the 
procedure of incorporating covenants in facilities agreements for different 
reasons. These hypothetical reasons will be compared with the contemplated 
practical implications, i.e. the protective value the covenants offer investors 
(meaning their intended effect, per their wording, as interpreted in light of 
the will of the parties, derivative of the results of the empirical study). This 
method will demonstrate different covenants’ value for the investor.  
 
High-yield bond instruments are somewhat renowned for their complex 
covenant packages. Whereas this may be true, it is still important to 
appreciate the fact that high-yield bond covenants are typically more 
functional than those found in senior bank loan agreements. This is due to 
the origination of the covenant packages used in high-yield bonds. Rather 
than being maintenance based, they are often incurrence based.58 
Maintenance covenants are employed to ensure the issuer’s on-going and 
continuous compliance with the terms and conditions, thereby safeguarding 
the issuer’s financial well-being. This is mainly managed by allowing 
creditors to detect early warning signs of weakening business of the debtor. 
Maintenance covenants are not typically used in high-yield indentures, and 
for this there is a reason; if notes are held by a large number of investors, the 
issuer would be inclined to get all noteholders organized on brief notice to 
agree on alterations on certain maintenance covenants based on the issuer’s 
financial conditions at the time. Due to the difficulties associated with this 
process, defaults upon covenant breaches would be frequently occurring.59 
When utilizing incurrence-oriented covenants, many of these problems are 
effectively avoided. As a result, the issuer is not burdened with covenant 
breaches beyond its control. Instead, incurrence-based covenants are 
                                                
57 Wood, p. 109.   
58 Norton Rose Fulbright, Accessing the debt capital markets – High yield bonds, June 2011 
[cit. Norton Rose Fulbright.]. 
59Maxwell, William F., and Shenkman, Mark R., Leveraged Financial Markets: A 
Comprehensive Guide to High-Yield Bonds, Loans and Other Instruments, chapter 8; Bonds 
Indentures and Bond Characteristics, by Whelan, William J. III., p. 3. [Cit. Whelan.]. The 
fact that high-yield bonds less frequently use maintenance covenants was also strongly 
affirmed by the empirical study. 
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designed to enable the issuer to test compliance against the covenant’s terms 
prior to taking an action. Such action may be incurring additional financial 
indebtedness, paying dividends or pledging assets as security for 
indebtedness. If the issuer ends up in a situation where it is necessary to 
plead with debtors for approving amendments to the covenant terms prior to 
taking a desired action, it can do so in a rational fashion.60 Hence, when it 
comes to high-yield indentures, incurrence covenants are customary 
whereas maintenance covenants are understandingly more common in bank 
debt facilities arrangements.61  
3.2 Covenants in Swedish high-yield 
bonds 
3.2.1 Introduction 
To date (October 2013), 38 high-yield bonds62 have been issued on the 
Swedish market. I have looked at their respective terms and conditions, 
thereby concluding which covenants that have been used in each indenture 
and what their given wording is.  
 
The section below will list all of the covenants that I have investigated in 
the course of the study.  The covenants that are listed have been used in at 
least one of the bonds of the survey. The summary of the covenants’ content 
in section 3.3 will provide the reader with a bird’s eye-perspective of how 
the parties on the Swedish high-yield bond market utilize covenants. The 
forthcoming section will provide the reader with a view of the hypothetical 
purposes behind employing the same covenants. This method clarifies the 
practical value of these covenants for the sake of investor protection, by 
exemplifying wordings that may result in ambiguous or undesired 
applications of the covenants in practice. 
 
Before we discuss the theory and purposes behind covenants, it needs to be 
clarified what a covenant breach results in—or in other words, the incentive 
for the issuer to adhere to the terms of the loan agreement. The incentive is 
rather straightforward; most covenants are designed so that if they are 
breached, it will cause the issuer to default under the notes. Upon this 
occurring, the contract usually states that the agent is allowed to accelerate 
the notes for early repayment.  
                                                
60 Whelan, p. 3 et seq. 
61 Kramer Levin, Banking and Finance Market Snapshot: A Beginner’s Guide to Thinking 
about Covenants, December 2006, p. 2. [cit. Kramer Levin]. Also compare with Lucas, 
Stephen, Ferguson, Robert and Meredith, David of law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 
Private Equity Transactions: Selecting Funding Sources, PLC Magazine, November 2011, 
p. 4.  
62 See supra section 1.3 for the definition of what constitutes a high-yield bond. 
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3.2.2 The purpose behind employing each 
covenant  
The covenants most frequently occurring throughout my examination of the 
indentures’ terms and conditions are listed below. They are given a general 
meaning and purpose, in light of their role in loan agreements and derivative 
of relevant literature. The actual results of the empirical survey, i.e. the 
contents of the covenants in the indentures, will be presented under section 
3.3.  
 
The purpose behind each covenant will now follow. Covenants that are 
simple in nature will only be briefly explained, since these covenants 
usually only serve a purpose with very limited scope. 
 
Negative pledge 
 
A negative pledge-covenant aims to prevent the borrower from creating any 
security upon any of its assets. The covenant is imperative in loan 
agreements, and the reason behind employing the clause has a lot to do with 
priority rights in bankruptcy.63 Absent this covenant, an act where the issuer 
grants security over any of its assets in favour of an outside creditor results 
in subordinating the initial noteholders’ unsecured claim, and, in turn, 
makes any pari passu-warranties of the issuer lose its effect.64 Before going 
further with negative pledges, something needs to be said about how a 
bond’s legal status is affirmed by invoking pari passu-clauses. A pari passu-
clause usually states that “The bonds are unsecured obligations of the issuer 
and rank at least pari passu, without any preference amongst themselves, 
with all other outstanding, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the 
issuer, present and future.”65 As stated, the clause is utilized to affirm the 
legal position of the notes—in particular the mandatory ranking of debt 
where there is competition within the creditor collective. A pari passu-
clause is normally not seen as a covenant, rather a warranty. The purpose is 
not to ensure that the issuer will pay all outstanding debts on a pro rata-basis 
upon insolvency (since that would entail the debtor would have to pay all 
debts pro rata—including the utility bill). Instead, the clause declares legal 
ranking, not legal equal payment.66  
 
Continuing with the negative pledge-covenant, it may be stated that it is 
advantageous in situations where the borrower ends up in financial distress 
and is unable to acquire additional indebtedness unless it is secured in real 
assets; a situation which the negative pledge-covenant prevents from taking 
place. Moreover, negative pledge-covenants are important for the purpose of 
secured indentures as well. In this case, it will avert complications occurring 
due to the creation of secondary priority rights held in an asset that is 
                                                
63 Compare with supra p. 21. 
64 Wood p. 111 et seq. 
65 Wood, p. 163.  
66 Wood, p. 118.  
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formerly pledged. Negative pledge-covenants also safeguards the interest of 
secured creditors by allotting both asset value as well as therein generated 
cash flow to the secured creditor, thereby giving the secured creditor more 
influence in a work-out or reorganisation.67 
 
No disposals 
 
A “no-disposal”-covenant sets out to establish that the issuer shall not be 
permitted to dispose of its assets with the main subject to transfer value to 
certain parties, detrimental to the position of the bondholders. A covenant 
with the purpose of restricting the issuer’s disposal rights to company assets 
has several reasons behind it. Predominantly, to prevent for the stripping of 
assets of the issuer by sales on credit to another (perhaps associated) 
corporation, resulting in key assets of the issuing corporation being turned 
to a claim on a possibly worthless one. Such conduct could result in 
unwanted changes of the business, which the bondholders certainly wish to 
prevent. Of additional importance is the restriction on the issuer’s right to 
dispose of company assets by realizing their value in order to pay off other 
creditors in case of financial difficulties. This conduct shifts the natural 
equality of treatment of the creditor collective (if the creditors are all 
unsubordinated and ranking pari passu), which is not in the interest of the 
creditors not benefitting from the restricted disposal.68  
 
Restrictions on disposal rights are often made to include any intra-group 
disposals. This is a concern for any creditor whose claim is towards the 
parent company (the issuer), not against a subsidiary of the issuer. 
Regardless of the intra-group character of the disposal, the result is still that 
the creditor is given an undesired commercial subordination.  
 
For the sake of allowing the issuer to maintain a level of control over its 
business, several exceptions to the restrictions are often granted. Examples 
of such exclusions include the right to dispose of company assets as long as 
it is in the ordinary course of the issuer’s business, leases (both operational 
and in the ordinary course of business), up to a specified basket amount, 
disposal of assets that are either obsolete or that are replaced with equal 
assets, and certain disposals where the net proceeds of such disposal is used 
to repay certain outstanding debt.69 
 
No distributions 
 
“No-distribution”-covenants sets out certain limitations in the issuer’s 
distribution rights of company assets. These constraints are likewise 
common in bond terms. Specifically, this covenant concerns dividends and 
distributions of shares. The reasons behind no distribution-covenants are to 
make sure that creditors receive payment prior to shareholders. These 
restrictions are typically not found in bond issues where the debtor is a 
                                                
67 Wood, p. 111 et seq.  
68 Wood, p. 120 et seq.  
69 Wood, p. 121 et seq.  
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publicly listed company, rather when it is a smaller, private corporation with 
a limited shareholder base.70 The restrictions in distribution rights are 
designed to guard the bondholders’ rights by imposing limitations on asset 
classes that rank below the notes in the issuer’s capital structure. It is 
nevertheless not uncommon that exceptions to the right to distribute assets 
are included in the covenant terms. For example, if such constrained 
distributions in aggregate amount to less than a certain percentage of 
proceeds derivative of a sale, or in relation to specified financial ratios.71  
 
Together, the two covenants above aim to restrict payments; i.e. what the 
issuer is permitted to do with cash and assets generated from different 
activities of the business, whether generated from operations or sales of 
company assets. The noteholders wish to create a snare around these values, 
and allow them out of the sphere of the group only under a limited set of 
circumstances. Hence, if the borrower decides to make a payment, it needs 
to test it against the applicable covenant aiming to restrict these types of 
payments so that it does not cause a covenant breach and subsequent 
acceleration of the notes. This ought to provide for a strong enough 
incentive not to make restricted payments that benefits only certain (perhaps 
junior) claimants.72    
 
Change of control 
 
Change of control-covenants protect creditors from presumed negative 
effects associated with alterations in the shareholding structure of the issuer. 
The clause is intended to allow the holder of the notes to reassess the 
investment in the debtor upon ensuing changes in ownership. Given that the 
issuer is not publicly traded, a change of control-event is often seen as 
occurring upon the cessation of ownership in the issuer by shareholders 
defined as permitted holders. These key individuals will usually be 
demanded to own, at any time, a majority of the outstanding shares of the 
issuer. The thinking behind this idea is that the noteholders made an 
investment decision upon the value added by the present shareholder 
structure, thus, upon a breach in this structure, their position is deemed to be 
negatively affected.73   
 
Usually, the breach will vest the bondholders with a right to demand the 
issuers’ unconditional payment of 101 per cent. of the nominal amount of 
the outstanding bonds. The reason is simple; should the investor wish to exit 
the investment due to the changed ownership, it may not be possible to trade 
the notes on the open market with satisfactory result due to value 
depreciation (since the market too may believe that the parting shareholders 
added value to the corporation). The issuer is instead forced to repurchase 
                                                
70 Wood, p. 124.  
71 Norton Rose Fulbright. 
72 Whelan, p. 6 et seq. 
73 Whelan, p. 5.  
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the notes at a premium, thereby decreasing incentives to allow for change of 
control-events to take place.74  
 
No New Financial Indebtedness 
 
This is a basic and fundamental debt covenant. Its objective is to ensure that 
a minimum level of financial strength is maintained by imposing restraints 
on the issuer’s ability to incur further debt obligations. Most debt covenants 
does however provide the issuer with the ability to incur what is defined as 
permitted debt. Permitted debt is often possible to incur regardless of the 
satisfaction of certain debt ratios. Standard exceptions could be existing 
bank debt, debt that is acquired in the ordinary course of the issuer’s 
business, or in accordance with certain basket limitations.75 
 
Cross-acceleration or cross-default 
 
These covenants share a common objective and mechanism, but differ 
slightly in how they work. The cross-acceleration covenant is a covenant 
that operates by defaulting the issuer under one agreement, when the issuer 
has defaulted under another agreement, and the creditors under the latter 
agreement have accelerated payment. The effect is, in short, that the 
creditors under one loan agreement benefits from default provisions under a 
completely different agreement. The cross-default covenant, on the other 
hand, leads to an automatic event of default under one agreement, if the 
issuer defaults under another agreement, irrespective of if the creditors 
under the second agreement accelerate payment.76 
 
Loan to Value (“LTV”) 
 
This is a covenant that is used to measure the value of a loan compared to 
the market value of a certain asset, or a pool of net assets.77  
 
Interest Coverage Ratio 
 
This covenant employs a ratio determining the ability of the issuer to pay its 
interest costs. The ratio is typically calculated by dividing the issuer’s 
EBIT78 or EBITDA79 with the interest costs incurred over the same period. 
This covenant is sometimes also called “Earnings to Interest Ratio”. The 
purpose is however the same, and the use of this covenant is typically very 
frequent. The aim is to test the issuer’s ability to pay interest on outstanding 
debt by ensuring that there are sufficient amounts of cash at hand for 
servicing it.80   
                                                
74 Whelan, p. 5. 
75 Norton Rose Fulbright. 
76 Practical Law, Glossary Item (http://uk.practicallaw.com/resource/3-382-3376) 
77 Compare with Investopedia article Loan-to-Value Ratio – LTV Ratio 
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loantovalue.asp). 
78 Earnings before interest and taxes. 
79 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.  
80 Wood, p. 123. 
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“Minimum Equity”, “Minimum Cash” and “Equity Ratio” 
 
These financial covenants demand that the issuer—at all times or at given 
test periods—shall have a minimum amount of equity and/or cash available, 
expressed in real numbers. The equity ratio, on the other hand, means that 
the borrower shall have a minimum ratio of shareholder’s equity; the 
amount shareholders would receive upon liquidation of the issuer. The ratio 
is recognized by calculating the issuer’s total assets (as defined in the 
definitions of the terms) with the total shareholder’s equity. 
 
Debt to EBITDA Ratio 
 
This is a covenant that measures leverage, by calculating the issuer’s debts 
(or net debts) divided by its EBITDA. The ratio is constructed to display the 
number of years it would take for the issuer to re-pay its debt if net debt and 
EBITDA figures remain the same. The overall purpose is to restrict the 
issuer taking up too much debt, detrimental to the solvency of the 
corporation.81  
 
Capital Coverage Ratio 
 
This covenant means, in outline, the result acquired when dividing the 
borrower’s tier 1 capital with its tier 2 capital. The ratio is engaged to shield 
investors by expressing a debtor’s exposures towards risk-weighted credit.82 
 
Listing requirements 
 
This means a demand from the bondholders that the issuer will list the 
bonds on a regulated marketplace. This is, as we have learnt, important 
since many investors are not allowed to invest in instruments that are not 
publicly traded. 
 
Financial statements 
 
This covenant enacts a requirement on the issuer to present to the 
bondholder its financial statements. Typically, this is required on a semi-
annual or quarterly basis, with the variations typically tied to the credit 
quality of the issuing corporation.83 
 
Compliance Certificate  
 
A compliance certificate is a certificate given in conjunction with financial 
statements reported by the issuer to the creditors under the terms of the 
facilities agreement. The clause is rather forthright. It is employed to 
facilitate for monitoring of the loan terms, examining the financial health of 
                                                
81 Wood, p. 124.  
82 Compare with Investopedia Article ”Capital Adequacy Ratio – CAR” 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitaladequacyratio.asp. 
83 Norton Rose Fulbright. 
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the issuer, as well as checking for potential defaults under certain 
provisions.84  
3.3 The results of the empirical research: 
how are covenants used in practice?  
In the beginning of each sub-section, an example of a covenant of one 
indenture will be listed. It is my ambition that this will facilitate the reader’s 
understanding of the covenants from a practical perspective. Following each 
example will be an account for the results of the empirical study: the 
ascribed wording of each covenant as it has been drafted in the terms and 
conditions of each bond. This method will demonstrate the patterns that 
have appeared throughout the course of the study. 
 
The methodology used for acknowledging the results of the empirical study 
will mainly consist of listing exceptions to the applicable covenant, to 
illustrate how the constructions and mechanisms are specifically tailored to 
the business of the issuer—in turn leading to great variances of how the 
same type of covenant is applied in different indentures. The complicated 
nature of many of these covenants results in several impediments regarding 
the homogeneousness of how it is possible to present the data of the study. It 
is quite simply impossible to get an adequate overview of the content of 
covenants without reducing and rationalizing the content of covenants into a 
more undeviating form. Therefore, I have eliminated covenant contents that 
I have deemed to be:  
 
(i) Too specific to the issuer, thus not applicable in a general 
perspective; and 
(ii) contents that are obvious for any loan agreement.  
 
These exceptions will, for the reasons above, not be listed.  
 
The reader needs to be aware of this fact when studying the data below, 
since no data is fully comprehensive and the deletion of data has been 
subject to my own subjective opinion of what fits under (i) and (ii) above.  
 
Some covenants are cited directly from the applicable terms and conditions, 
some have been altered slightly due to their sometimes very specific 
content.  
3.3.1 Negative pledge 
The negative pledge-clause is by many standards one of the most important 
instruments in a loan agreement. The text below exemplifies the rigorous 
structure of how a typical clause may be composed in a high-yield bond 
facility agreement: 
                                                
84 Wood, p. 111.  
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“The Issuer shall not, and shall procure that none of its Subsidiaries, create 
or permit to subsist any Security over any of its assets, unless such security 
is Permitted Security. 
 
Where “Permitted Security” means any guarantee or security: (a) arising 
by operation of law (including collateral or retention of title arrangements 
in connection with Advance Purchase Agreements but, for the avoidance of 
doubt, not including guarantees or security in respect of any monies 
borrowed or raised); (b) provided in relation to any lease agreement 
(hyresavtal) entered into by a Group Company in the ordinary course of 
business; (c) provided in relation to any Bank Loan constituting Permitted 
Debt; (d) comprising counter-indemnity obligations under any bank 
guarantees or letters of credit issued by a bank or financial institution and 
drawings under any such bank guarantees or letters of credit, which in each 
case is provided in the ordinary course of business in relation to customers, 
other business partners, governmental bodies or authorities on terms and 
conditions customary for counter-indemnity obligations; or (e) comprising 
parent company guarantees in relation to Subsidiary undertakings under 
customer contracts incurred in the Ordinary course of business. 
 
Where “Permitted debt” means any Financial Indebtedness: (a) related to 
any Group Company’s lease agreements (hyresavtal) or finance leases, 
provided that such Financial Indebtedness is incurred in the ordinary 
course of such Group Company’s business and, as regards finance leases, 
in an aggregate maximum amount not, at any time, exceeding SEK 
30,000,000; (b) taken up from a Group Company; (c) incurred by the Issuer 
or any Group Company under Bank Loans; (d) arising under a derivative 
transaction entered into in connection with protection against or benefit 
from fluctuation in any rate or price where such exposure arises in the 
ordinary course of business or in respect of payments to be made under the 
Finance Documents, but not a derivative transaction for investment or 
speculative purposes; (e) incurred as a result of any Group Company 
acquiring another entity and which is due to that such acquired entity holds 
indebtedness; (f) incurred in the ordinary course of business under Advance 
Purchase Agreements; (g) incurred under any counter-indemnity obligation 
having the effect of Financial Indebtedness incurred in the ordinary course 
of business and constituting Permitted Security; or (h) incurred by the 
Issuer in relation to any Market Loans, provided that such Market Loans 
ranks pari passu or is subordinated to the obligations of the issuer under the 
Finance Documents, and has a final redemption date which occurs after the 
Final Redemption Date; and 
 
where “Bank loan” means means any existing loans incurred by the Issuer 
or any Group Company in relation to Swedbank AB (publ), or any future 
loan incurred by the Issuer or any Group Company in relation to any 
reputable bank.”85 
 
                                                
85 Terms and Conditions for Opus Group AB’s (publ) maximum SEK 200 000 000 senior 
unsecured floating rate notes, ISIN SE0005466034. 
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Negative pledge-covenants were used in all indentures but seven, making it 
one of the most frequently used covenants within the scope. Major 
differences were identified as regards the given wording, with certain 
apparent patterns. As for permitted guarantees and/or securities, the most 
common exceptions to the negative pledge provisions were guarantees or 
securities provided in relation to any: 
 
§ Lease agreements; 
§ loans in the ordinary course of the issuer’s business or trading; 
§ working capital facilities; 
§ overdraft credit facilities; 
§ advance purchase agreements; 
§ security provided to a specific entity or fund;  
§ shares in subsidiaries; and 
§ under a basket (where amounts were either expressed in in real 
numbers, or as a percentage of certain financial indicators).  
 
As expected, the value of the negative pledge covenant for the high-yield 
noteholder is decreased significantly upon deviance from its default 
wording. If the debtor is allowed to create security upon its assets for the 
purpose of raising additional debt, bondholders may face a situation where 
they will be worse off than anticipated, should the debtor default. This is 
because whoever has been granted a security or guarantee will rank senior to 
the noteholders if the noteholders are unsecured. If noteholders are secured, 
and security has been granted to an outside party, the value of the 
noteholders’ security may be reduced. Hence, it may be asserted that 
negative-pledge clauses offer great value for the investor in their default 
form. Likewise, however, it may be asserted that this value fluctuates 
depending on which exceptions are granted. 
 
Investors should, according to me, look out for negative pledge-covenants 
that permit the issuer to provide security for indebtedness up to a specified 
amount that is too high, i.e. basket volumes that are far too generous. 
Investors should also be concerned if securities may be provided to certain 
specific entities (a bank, for example)—especially if there is no adequate 
basket limiter that kicks in. Moreover, investors should look out if the issuer 
is permitted to create security upon its assets benefitting creditors under an 
initial senior bank debt, subject to an increase of the debt by a certain 
percentage. Furthermore, there is a trade-off situation that needs to be taken 
into calculation when assessing the negative effects of having exceptions to 
negative pledge-covenants that may be believed to be necessary to ensure 
that the borrower can conduct its day-to-day business in a flexible yet 
controlled manner. Herein lies the issuer’s ability to create security upon its 
assets for the benefit of loans in the ordinary course of business, as well as 
with working capital- and overdraft credit facilities. These carve-outs should 
to some extent be permitted to ensure that the issuer can maintain its daily 
operations. It is however essential that the basket amount is kept fairly low 
to ensure that this option is not misused. 
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To conclude the implications of negative pledge-covenants in practice, a 
few matters stand out as being of significance. Given the rarity of 
comprehensive negative pledges (i.e. completely restricting the borrower’s 
ability to create security over its assets), issuers and investors alike 
understand the necessity to have certain abilities to incur secured asset 
funding. However, negative pledge-clauses are employed very frequently 
across the scope of the study, it tells us that investors believe the covenant to 
be important for their protection. This leads us to an interesting 
predicament: notwithstanding wordings, does negative pledge-covenants 
serve their intended purpose under Swedish law? Specifically, the question 
revolves around the clauses’ contemplated effect on a third party, i.e. a 
person outside of the contractual relationship between noteholder and issuer 
that accepts security in an asset in conflict with the agreement entered into 
between the initial borrower and the initial lender. Because of the indicated 
significance of negative pledges, and the possible divergence between the 
purpose and practical implication, this is a question that will be thoroughly 
covered in the coming chapter. 
3.3.2 No disposals 
No disposal-clauses and no distribution-clauses share a common objective: 
to keep values within the issuer, and/or within the issuer group. As the 
exemplifying illustrations below enlightens, these covenants are subject to 
rather complex mechanisms of carve-outs: 
 
“(a) The Issuer shall not, and shall procure that no Material Group 
Company, make(s) a Restricted Disposal, unless such disposal is carried out 
at fair market value and on terms and conditions customary for such 
transaction and provided that it does not have a Material Adverse Effect. 
The Issuer shall promptly notify the Agent and the Bondholders of any 
Restricted Disposal and, upon request by the Agent, provide the Agent with 
any information relating to the transaction which the Agent deems 
necessary (acting reasonably).  
 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) above, the Issuer may not sell or 
otherwise dispose of shares in any Guarantor. 
 
a Restricted Disposal means:  
 
a sale or otherwise disposal of shares in any Material Group Company or of 
all or substantially all of the Issuer's or any Material Group Company's 
assets, or operations to any person not being the Issuer or any of its wholly-
owned Subsidiaries.” 86   
 
The empirical study showed uniform usages of no disposal-covenants. At 
first glance, clauses seem to offer rigid protection for the investors. The 
                                                
86 Terms and conditions for ÅR Packaging Group AB’s (publ) maximum EUR 115 000 000 
bonds, ISIN SE0005224029. 
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implication does however seem converse when studying contents more 
closely. I conclude that the risks herein lie in the frequent use of vague 
terms, such as material adverse effect and arm’s length terms (and to some 
extent, fair market value even though this should be easier to define).  
 
Most frequent is the practice of fair market value, used in 14 out of 25 
bonds that employed the no-disposal-covenant. Material adverse effect was 
used in 9/25 bonds, and arm’s length terms in 5/25.  
 
In light of this data, is it possible to satisfactory answer the question whether 
the purpose to prevent the issuer from disposing of company assets differs 
from how the covenant is employed, given that these terminologies are 
used? The short answer to this question is that it is not. The long answer is 
that whereas theory and practice may be comparable, it is not possible to 
engage in answering the question without agreeable definitions of each 
term, or viable arguments as to the necessity to incorporate normative 
functions as instruments for settlement. This brings about a challenging 
discussion, which too will be covered in the coming chapter.    
3.3.3 No distributions 
With no distributions-covenants, appeared discrepancies between theory and 
practice finally seem to ease—at least on a more general level. The study 
did however display a very dense use of carve-outs, which of course enables 
the borrower more freedom to act in its own self-interest.  
 
“(a) The Issuer shall not, and shall procure that none of its Subsidiaries 
will: 
 
(i) pay any dividend on its shares (other than loans and group 
contributions to the Issuer or a Subsidiary of the Issuer); 
(ii) repurchase any of its own shares; 
(iii) redeem its share capital or other restricted equity with 
repayment to shareholders; 
(iv) grant any loans (other than to the Issuer or a wholly 
owned Subsidiary of the Issuer); or 
(v) make any other similar distribution or transfers of value to 
the direct or indirect shareholder of the Issuer, or any 
Affiliates of the Issuer (other than the Issuer or another 
Subsidiary of the Issuer). 
 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) above, the Issuer may distribute fifty 
(50) per cent. of the Net Disposal Proceeds upon a Disposal of assets in 
accordance with Clause […] (Disposal of Assets) below, if at the time of the 
payment: 
 
(i) no Event of Default is continuing; and 
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(ii) the Incurrence Test is met (calculated on a pro forma basis 
including the relevant distribution).”87 
 
Carve-outs to restrictions imposed on the borrower were used 
comprehensively, though with surprising levels of uniformity. Only 6/39 
bonds lacked the covenant entirely. The wording of the covenants that were 
employed each specified what constitutes a restricted distribution. 
Principally, contents corresponded well to that of the example closed 
disclosed above, as regards section (a), subsection (i)-(iii). Distinctiveness 
varied considerably more as regards subsection (b), (and its counterparties 
in other terms and conditions setting out the scope of the applicable 
covenant)—with patterns being recognized either in usage of financial 
indicators expressed in percentages, or in real numbers.  
 
Regardless of the vast usage of exceptions to restricted distributions, I 
conclude that the effects of this clause are far more foreseeable and well-
defined in nature. One notable aspect is that this covenant displayed such 
uniformed wordings that it may perhaps even be contemplated that it could 
be incorporated in some form in the SSDA’s standardized loan agreement 
(with abilities to individualize certain aspects, such as under (b)).      
3.3.4 Change of control 
A change of control-provision shares the objective to keep values within the 
issuer with the two covenants above. The value here is however tied to 
human capital, rather than monetary.  
 
“Change of control means: 
 
(i) the occurrence of an event or series of events whereby one or 
more Persons, not being […] (or  an Affiliate of […], acting 
in concert, control shares in the Issuer representing more 
than 30 per cent. of the votes in the Issuer or otherwise gain 
direct or indirect control of the issuer;  
(ii) the shares in the Issuer ceasing to be listed on NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm; or 
(iii) the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the Group 
whether in a single transaction or a series of related 
transactions. 
 
whereas "control" means the power (whether by way of ownership of 
shares, proxy, contract, agency or otherwise) to: 
 
(i) appoint  or remove all, or the majority, of the directors or other 
equivalent officers of [the issuer]; or  
                                                
87 Terms and conditions for ÅR Packaging Group AB’s (publ) maximum EUR 115 000 000 
bonds, ISIN SE0005224029. 
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(ii) give directions with respect to the operating and financial 
policies of [the issuer] with which the directors or other 
equivalent officers of [the issuer] are obliged to comply, and 
"acting in concert" means a group of persons who, pursuant to 
an agreement or understanding (whether formal or informal), 
actively co-operate, through the acquisition directly or indirectly 
of shares in the Issuer by any of them, either directly or 
indirectly, to obtain or consolidate control of the Issuer.”88 
 
Two materially opposing approaches to change of control-clauses were 
identified; either, upon the cessation of ownership of certain defined 
individuals, or upon the gain of control of (typically more than fifty per 
cent.) by certain defined individuals. Variations of percentage limitations as 
to when control is considered to have taken place were also identified. The 
majority of the bond terms specified that a change of control event occurs if 
any person or persons—acting in concert, directly or indirectly—acquire 
more than fifty per cent. of the shares in the issuer. To some extent, there 
were exceptions to the limitation insofar as certain entities or persons were 
allowed to hold more than fifty per cent.  
 
However, certain other practices entailing a change of control-event were 
identified: 
 
§ If the issuer ceases to be a subsidiary of a specified parent; 
§ if a person or several persons acquire control of appointment 
rights, i.e. the right to appoint or remove the majority of the 
board of directors; 
§ controlling of shares representing 30 per cent. of the votes in 
the issuer; 
§ if certain individuals—directly or indirectly—cease to own 
and control at least 51 per cent. of the votes and shares of the 
issuer; 
§ at the occurrence of an IPO (initial public offering); 
§ delisting of the shares of the issuer on a regulated market;  
§ if the main shareholder ceases to control the issuer; 
§ the occurrence of an event or series of events whereby a 
person not being the main shareholder, or an affiliate of the 
main shareholder, acquire control of the issuer; and 
§ if a certain entity ceases to own twenty per cent. of the shares 
of the issuer, or if any person or entity, acting in concert, 
becomes the largest shareholder in the issuer, or if any person 
or entity, acting in concert, acquires control of more than 
thirty per-cent of the shares of the issuer; 
 
The benchmark outcome of a change of control-event—known as a put 
option—was early redemption of the outstanding notes at an amount 
corresponding to 101 per cent. of the nominal amount of the bonds.  
                                                
88 Terms and Conditions for Cloetta AB’s (publ) Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate 
Notes, ISIN SE0005364437. 
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The study clearly showed that change of control-covenants are believed to 
offer investors protection against detrimental changes in ownership of the 
issuing corporation since they were frequently used. Only four out of 38 
indentures lacked a change of control-provision of some dignity. The aspect 
that is of interest when looking at the covenants is the mechanisms used to 
establish whether a change of control-event has occurred or not. This brings 
about an interesting discussion as regards a feature known as portability. 
The term refers to approaches developed to allow for acquisitions to takes 
place, absent a requisite for a change of control-offer. An effective remedy 
lies in expanding the definition of permitted holders, as illustrated in a noted 
high-yield bond issued by the British privately held insurance company 
Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) PLC (“Hastings”).89 A distinguished 
aspect of the change of control-provision in Hastings is its wide definition 
of permitted holders. This has material effect on when the provision is 
triggered, and therefore, when a change of control-redemption—which is 
fundamentally important for investor protection purposes—may occur.90  
 
In the Hastings case, the permitted holders consisted of the corporation’s 
initial investors and their related parties. The initial investors were, inter 
alios, certain named management investors, as well as the sponsors. What 
stands out in Hastings is the definition of sponsors, being extraordinarily 
wide. Amongst others, the investment bank Goldman Sachs Group Inc., 
(“GS”) was one. The definition included GS’ affiliates, any partnership 
where an affiliate is a general partner, as well as any fund managed, advised, 
sponsored or owned by any of the two aforementioned. All of these parties 
were struck by the permitted holders definition, at the date where the 
acquisition was completed. Moreover, a shareholder, a member or partner of 
either a partnership where an affiliate of GS is a general partner or a fund 
managed, advised, sponsored or owned in accordance with the above, was 
also included in the list of permitted holders. This ending statement is 
important since it hypothetically means that GS’ financial exposure, i.e. deal 
participation, could be heavily reduced due to the lack of requirement to 
hold a minimum amount of shares in the issuing corporation.91 If an investor 
decided to buy the notes because of GS’ good name attached to the issuer, 
they could find themselves very mislead.  
 
If this way of drafting change of control-clauses would win ground in 
Swedish high-yield indentures, investors should approach them with caution 
given that an investment decision has been made upon the value added by 
the current ownership structure. Investors should in that case try to invoke a 
definition of permitted holders with clear-cut limitations, thus forbidding 
initial investors to reduce their equity by selling shares in the issuer to 
parties remotely related to them. In sum, such deviating aspects identified as 
risks in accordance with the above were hardly identified in the empirical 
                                                
89 Debt Xplained, Hastings – Portability by Novel Means, October 2013, p. 1.  [cit. Debt 
Xplained]. 
90 Debt Xplained, p. 2. 
91 Debt Xplained, p. 2 et seq.  
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study. But, due to the levels of criticism that may be appointed to such 
executed clauses as the one in the Hastings’s case, investors should keep an 
open eye as to the definition of key individuals’ affiliates and alike to 
counteract similar behaviour in Swedish indentures. 
3.3.5 No new financial indebtedness 
This clause is employed to ensure that the issuer’s cash flow is designated to 
service the noteholders’ loan, and not other debt obligations. The empirical 
study showed, besides countless carve-outs permitting the raising of new 
financial indebtedness, that issuers were repeatedly permitted to incur new 
indebtedness that has a maturity date after the outstanding notes. In 
addition, it was often specified that the new financial indebtedness should 
never have higher priority than the notes, for the very same reason. 
 
“The Issuer shall not, and shall procure that none of its Subsidiaries, incur 
any additional Financial Indebtedness or maintain any existing Financial 
Indebtedness, provided however that the Issuer and the Subsidiaries have a 
right to incur and maintain Financial Indebtedness that constitute Permitted 
Debt. 
 
where “Permitted Debt” means debt (a) related to any Group Company’s 
lease agreements (Sw. hyresavral) provided that such Financial 
Indebtedness is incurred in the ordinary course of such Group Company’s 
business; (b) related to any Group Company’s finance leases, provided that 
such Financial Indebtedness is incurred in the ordinary course of such 
Group Company’s business and in an aggregate maximum amount not, at 
any time, exceeding SEK 2,000,000; (c) taken up from a Group Company; 
(d) related to any Shareholder Loans; (e) arising under a derivative 
transaction entered into in connection with protection against or benefit 
from fluctuation in any rate or price where such exposure arises in the 
ordinary course of business or in respect of payments to be made under the 
Terms and Conditions, but not a derivative transaction for investment or 
speculative purposes; (f) incurred in the ordinary course of business under 
Advance Purchase Agreements; (g) incurred by the Issuer if such Financial 
Indebtedness meets the Incurrence Test tested pro forma including such 
incurrence, and (i) is incurred as a result of Subsequent Bond Issue, or (ii) 
ranks pari passu or is subordinated to the obligations of the Issuer under 
the Terms and Conditions and the Agent Agreement, and has a final 
redemption date or, when applicable, early redemption dates or instalment 
dates which occur after the Final Redemption Date; (h) incurred under any 
counter-indemnity obligation having the effect of Financial Indebtedness 
incurred in the ordinary course of business and constituting Permitted 
Security; or (i) not permitted by (a)-(i) above, and related to (one or 
several) credit and guarantee facilities for guarantee and working capital 
purposes, in an aggregate maximum amount not exceeding SEK 75,000,000, 
and where a maximum of SEK 25,000,000 can be utilized for working 
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capital purposes and where the working capital part of the facility shall be 
undrawn at the Issue Date (the “Revolving Credit Facility”).”92 
 
The study showed very deviating usages of this covenant. Even though the 
purpose is to keep value inside the corporation by not having competing 
destinations for the borrower’s cash-flow (for loan servicing), the purpose is 
likewise to ensure that no additional creditors are allowed to enter the 
capital structure of the issuer. This is true both as regards maintaining a pari 
passu structure amongst all unsecured creditors, and ensuring that no 
creditors with priority rights are let in. Hence, the investor should ensure 
that the issuer is not allowed to incur additional financial indebtedness, 
unless it is provided that: 
 
(i) It ranks pari passu or is subordinated to the noteholders’ 
claim; and 
(ii) that cash-flow does not need to compete when it comes to 
repayment of the principal; meaning that the final maturity 
date of additional indebtedness should be (long) after the 
noteholders’. 
 
Of substantial importance for these purposes is the magnitude of the carve-
outs, but also the basket amount. If this is too great, the issuer is permitted 
to incur indebtedness regardless if not in accordance with (i) and (ii) above. 
The study displayed basket amounts of varying distinction, expressed either 
in real numbers or as a percentage of financial indicators. What stood out as 
interesting according to the empirical study was the proportion of the basket 
amount in relation to volume circulating of the notes. In average, the “no 
new financial indebtedness”-basket spanned from—in applicable cases and 
subject to conditions such as that new indebtedness may never rank higher 
than the outstanding notes—95 per cent. to 1 per cent. of the volume 
circulating (with an average of 17 per cent.).  
 
Other permitted financial indebtedness included financial indebtedness: 
 
§ For currency hedging purposes; 
§ under working capital facilities and advance purchase agreements; 
§ in the ordinary course of business; 
§ that is intra-group (meaning indebtedness owed to a group 
company); 
§ lease agreements or finance leases; 
§ owed to a specified bank, fund or entity; and 
§ subject to incurrence tests of varying nature.   
 
It may be asserted that basket limitations’ importance increases crucially 
when usage of exceptions to covenants is extensive, thus making up for 
problems related to ascertaining the legal value of the covenant. In this 
context, the basket amount acts as a final frontier. In parity with prior 
                                                
92 Terms and Conditions for Etravelli AB (publ) maximum EUR 120 000 000 senior 
callable floating rate notes, with ISIN SE0005393220. 
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conclusions, this covenant also has to provide the borrower with flexibility 
to manoeuvre whilst still fulfilling its objectives. Permitting a basket amount 
of great value may however not be necessary; on the contrary, I think it 
should be refrained from by any investor if the matter is not a deal-breaker 
in the negotiations of the terms and conditions.  
3.3.6 Cross-acceleration and cross-default 
Most sizable corporations today are heavily dependent on external funding. 
As a result, they may have several unresolved credits obtained from 
different providers. These loans are varying in proportion, priority and 
duration. This is a risk for additional creditors (especially ones that are low 
in the food chain of priority rights), but also an opportunity that should be 
seized, in a sense that it can be utilized to create an additional safety net for 
the noteholders. 
 
“The Agent is entitled, on behalf of the Holders, to declare all but not only 
some of the Bonds due for payment immediately or at such later date as the 
Agent determines (such later date not being a date falling later than […] 
[(…)] Banking Days from the date on which the Agent made such 
declaration), if: the Company or a Group Company does not pay when due 
any payment or otherwise fails to fulfil the terms and conditions under any 
Financial Indebtedness granted to the Company or a Group Company and 
such Financial Indebtedness due to the failure to pay has been accelerated 
for payment or could have been accelerated, or if the Financial 
Indebtedness could not be accelerated or if the outstanding payment was the 
last payment under the Financial Indebtedness, if the failure to pay has been 
continuing for at least […] [(…)] Banking Days, where the aggregate 
outstanding and unpaid Financial Indebtedness in question amounts to at 
least SEK […] (or the equivalent thereof in other currencies).”93  
 
Covenants regarding events of cross-default and cross-acceleration aim to 
cover the customary spectrum of possible default scenarios, thereby 
increasing the safety net of the bondholders by expanding the scope under 
which the outstanding notes may be accelerated. As a result, if the issuer (or 
any group company, typically) is unable to pay its debts or generally 
suspends any of its payments, the notes under the bond may be declared 
payable. However, a set of restrictions as to when the notes may be declared 
payable is present in the majority of cases. These restrictions are often 
dependant on a basket amount; the debt declared payable may not be 
inferior to that amount. If the basket amount is ten million, cross-default or 
cross-acceleration is not possible if the other debt declared due and payable 
amounts to nine million. Consequently, it goes without saying that the size 
of the basket is of interest for the subject of investor protection, since the 
cross-acceleration or cross-default covenants lose their edge should the 
basket amount be too excessive.  
                                                
93 Terms and Conditions for Ferronordic Machines AB’s maximum SEK 400,000,000 
12.00 % Bonds, ISIN SE0004020766. 
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The usage of the mechanisms behind the covenants varied very little 
amongst the bonds of the survey. Therefore, I chose only to investigate 
differences is basket values since I believe this is vital for the usability of 
the clause. All bonds, except for three, made use of a covenant regarding 
cross events of default- or acceleration. The basket amounts varied from 
SEK one million, to SEK 150 000 000. In some instances, the basket 
amount was not applicable if owed to a group company—which drastically 
decreases the clause’s value. The average basket amount according to the 
data of the survey was just above SEK 31 000 000 (31 021 470,59). The 
average number is however not particularly interesting since the volume 
circulating of the different indentures varies greatly. More interestingly is 
the proportion of basket size to the aggregate value of the notes (i.e. volume 
circulating), which in average amounted to 6.13 per cent. In light of this 
number, it may be possible to affirm standards in the SSDA’s standard 
agreement that span within a range not too far from it. The empirical study 
showed rather deviating numbers of basket sizes. Some were very large in 
proportion to the bond’s volume, which is detrimental to investors and 
beneficial for borrowers.  
3.3.7 Ratios, statements and certificates 
The covenants clauses listed below provide creditors with the ability to get a 
precise and distinct image of the issuer’s financial health. As the covenants’ 
purpose and application is rather forthright, limited questions arise as to 
problems with legal implications in practice. Hence, limited space will be 
appointed to them here. 
3.3.7.1 LTV 
Loan to value-covenants provide creditors with a distinct and precise image 
of the issuer’s financial health. 
 
“So long as the Bonds remain outstanding, the Company undertakes to 
ensure that the ratio of Total Net Senior Debt to Total Loan Book is not 
greater than […][(…)] per cent.”94 
 
Only seven out of thirty-eight bond terms contained a loan to value-
covenant. The most viable explanation to this is most likely that a loan to 
value-covenant is fundamentally interesting for corporations akin to one 
another, typically within the same line of business. As the empirical study 
shows, such is the case. All issuers that employed this covenant were either 
in the real estate- or (consumer) finance sector. These sectors are typically 
highly leveraged. The LTV-covenants of the indentures typically required a 
loan to value ratio of 80-85 per cent. Two real estate companies required a 
loan to value ratio of 60-75 per cent., with varying leverage allowed 
                                                
94 Terms and Conditions for Bayport Management Limited Maximum SEK 700,000,000 
Bonds, ISIN SE0003617216. 
 45 
depending on the type of property mortgaged. For example, properties with 
attractive locations were permitted to have higher leveraging.  
3.3.7.2 Interest coverage ratio 
“So long as any Bonds remain outstanding, the Company undertakes to 
ensure that the ratio of Funds From Operations to Interest Expense is not 
less than […][(…)] per cent.”95 
 
Interest coverage ratio-based covenants were employed in fifteen 
indentures, making it one of the most frequently occurring financial ratio 
incurrence covenants.  
	  
Interest coverage ratios are very efficient in revealing the present financial 
health of the issuer, since the ratio displays the issuer’s abilities to pay 
interest costs necessary for servicing its loans. The higher the ratio, the 
better is the issuer’s abilities to stay afloat during harsher times in case of 
downturns in revenue. The more risk and volatility involved in the issuer’s 
business, the higher should the minimum interest coverage ratio be to 
protect the investor from suspension of payment. 
 
Fourteen bonds in total were issued in 2013. Of these, eight bonds included 
an interest coverage ratio. It may therefore be asserted that interest coverage 
ratios are more frequently used today, since the remaining seven bonds 
employing an interest coverage ratio had issue dates ranging from late 2010 
until late 2012. In other words, it is a trend on an uprising. Personally, I 
think that it is a very usable covenant. It should work in every company and 
therefore it may be suggested that it would be a good idea to open up for the 
usage of it in the SSDA’s standard agreement.  
3.3.7.3 Minimum equity and minimum cash 
These covenants are different from the ones that are ratio-based, since they 
are maintenance-oriented rather than incurrence-oriented.  
 
“So long as any bonds remain outstanding, or at or until such other date as 
set forth below, the Company undertakes to ensure that  
 
(i) the Equity amounts to not less than SEK […] (where “Equity” 
means the consolidated book-value of the Group’s total 
shareholder’s equity according to the latest Financial Report.) and  
(ii) that there at all times is an Available Cash Amount (which means 
that the Company has cash or cash equivalents (Sw. kassa) 
corresponding to at least 7 per cent. of the outstanding Nominal 
Amount available at its disposal.”96 
 
                                                
95 Terms and Conditions for Bayport Management Limited Maximum SEK 700,000,000 
Bonds, ISIN SE0003617216. 
96 Terms and Conditions for Catella AB’s (publ) Maximum SEK 300,000,000 Senior 
Unsecured Bonds, ISIN SE0004809630. 
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Ten bonds utilized a minimum equity-covenant. Amounts varied greatly. 
The purpose of having an equity covenant is to ensure company creditors 
that the issuer is financially fit. The purpose behind a minimum cash-
covenant is to ensure financial fitness in a narrower scope; presumably, that 
sufficient cash is available to service outstanding debt. The covenant was 
employed in seven cases.  
3.3.7.4 Debt to EBITDA ratio 
“The Company undertakes to ensure that, the Net Debt to EBITDA ratio 
does not on any Reference Date exceed […] during the period from and 
including […] until the Redemption Date.”97 
 
The debt to EBITDA ratio displays, in sum, the issuer’s abilities to decrease 
its outstanding debt liabilities. As a result, the assertion that this should be a 
popular covenant to employ seems fitting. Even so, the covenant was 
employed in no more than twelve cases. The required test to be met should 
this covenant not be breach stipulated a Net Debt to EBITDA ratio of 
between 2.5:1 and 6.0:1, with an average of 3.75:1. In some instances, it 
was stipulated that actions such as acquiring additional indebtedness of 
making disposals was subject to the Net Debt to EBITDA test being met. 
3.3.7.5 Equity ratio 
Equity ratio-covenants were used in only ten loan agreements. Sometimes, 
the covenant was used as a complement to minimum equity amounts (as a 
maintenance covenant), and sometimes it was used solitary. Divergences 
between theoretical purpose, i.e. defining the issuer’s equity compared to its 
total assets, and practical implication, was scarce. Investors should however 
ensure that the definition of the ratio’s variables is in accordance with 
market practice, neither being too wide nor too narrow. The requirement 
spanned between 15 per cent. of equity compared to total assets, and 40 per 
cent. of equity compared to total assets. The average ratio required was a 
little over 25 per cent. In one instance it was stipulated that this test ought to 
be met in order for the borrower to be allowed to perform value transfers to 
shareholders, which seems to me like an admirable approach.  
 
“The Agent is, on behalf of the Bondholders, entitled to declare all, but not 
only some, of the Bonds due for payment immediately, or at such time as the 
Agent determines by notice to the Company, if at any time; the Equity to 
Total Assets Ratio fall below 25 per cent.”98 
3.3.7.6 Capital coverage ratio 
The capital coverage ratio-covenant was only used in two cases. This comes 
as no surprise since the covenant has a clear field of application, which only 
fills its intended purpose when comparing an outstanding loan book is 
compared with a senior loan to ensure that the leverage is not too high. 
                                                
97 Terms and Conditions for Ferronordic Machines AB’s maximum SEK 400,000,000 
12.00 % Bonds, ISIN SE0004020766. 
98 Terms and Conditions for Arise Windpower AB’s (publ) SEK 350,000,000 Bond, ISIN 
SE0004518769. 
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“For as long as the Bonds remain outstanding, the Company undertakes to 
procure that the Group maintains a Total Shareholders’ Equity to Capital 
Employed ratio of at least […] per cent. (where Capital Employed means 
the Total Shareholders’ Equity plus Interest Bearing Debt).” 99  
3.3.7.7 Listing requirements 
The reason to employ a requirement for listing is a necessity in order to 
entice investors that are not allowed to invest in securities that are not traded 
publicly.100  
	  
”The Issuer shall use its best efforts to ensure that the Notes are listed on 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm within two (2) months after the First Issue Date, 
and that they remain admitted for as long as any Notes remain outstanding 
or, if such listing is not possible to obtain or maintain, listing on another 
Regulated Market. Upon any issue of Subsequent Note, the Issuer shall 
promptly, but not later than ten (10) Business Days after the relevant issue 
date, procure that the volume of Notes listed is increased accordingly.”101 
 
All bonds of the study except for one had listing requirements, to some 
extent, included in the terms and conditions. The majority part had strict 
requirements for listing, whereas a not negligible amount of bonds had 
requirements on a best- or reasonable effort basis. The absolute majority of 
the bonds defined the regulated marketplace where the bonds should be 
admitted. NASDAQ OMX Stockholm was the default choice in most 
cases—and in several instances—a listing on the Corporate Bond list on 
NASDAQ was preordained.  
3.3.7.8 Financial statements 
The incorporating of clauses demanding the issuer to make available its 
financial statements is imperative for any loan agreement, those of high-
yield bonds included. This statement is backed by the results of the 
empirical study, showing that all issuers where—according to the terms and 
conditions of their respective indenture—required to publish financial 
reports. 
 
“The Issuer will make the following information available to the 
Noteholders by way of press release and by publication on the website of the 
Group: 
 
(i) as soon as the same become available, but in any event within […] 
[(…)] months after the end of each financial year, its audited 
consolidated financial statements for that financial year; 
                                                
99 Terms and Conditions for PA Resources AB’s (publ) SEK 850,000,000 Bond, ISIN 
SE0003652577. 
100 Compare with supra at p. 32. 
101 Terms and Conditions for Cloetta AB’s (publ) Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate 
Notes, ISIN SE0005364437. 
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(ii)  as soon as the same become available, but in any event within […] 
[(…)] months after the end of each quarter of its financial year, its 
unaudited consolidated financial statements or the year-end report 
(bokslutskommuniké) (as applicable) for such period.”102 
Few notable aspects arose as regards this covenant. The vast majority of 
issuers were required to publish reports on a quarterly basis; only three were 
allowed to publish the statements semi-annually. Three facilities agreements 
demanded publication of financial statements in accordance with the rules 
required by NASDAQ OMX, from time to time.  
 
3.3.7.9 Compliance certificate 
Few noteworthy features of the usage of compliance certificate-clauses were 
recognized. In general, it may be submitted that it is hard to ascertain the 
general purpose behind a compliance certificate, since the definition of what 
the certificate is supposed to show compliance to fluctuate. Nevertheless, all 
of the bonds of the survey employed a compliance certificate, that is, a 
certificate requiring at least that the issuers guarantees compliance to the 
terms and conditions of the loan agreement. In some cases, the form of 
compliance certificate stipulated stricter requirements, inter alia adherence 
to the fulfilment of certain financial ratios and incurrence tests.  
 
“If the Agent is investigating an event or circumstance which it reasonably 
believes is an Event of Default or which would (with the expiry of a grace 
period, the giving of notice, the making of any determination or any 
combination of any of the foregoing) constitute an Event of Default, the 
Issuer shall within 30 days from the Agent's request submit a compliance 
certificate to the Agent. Such compliance certificate shall be in a form 
agreed between the Issuer and the Agent and shall contain (i) a 
confirmation that no Event of Default has occurred (or if an Event of 
Default has occurred, what steps have been taken to remedy it), (ii) a 
confirmation that the Liquid Assets are equal to or exceeds the Debt Service 
Amount, and (iii) copies of any notices sent to the Regulated Market on 
which the Notes are listed.”103 
 
The demand to provide compliance certificates was hence strict across the 
board. In relation to these certificates, a few aspects stand out as being of 
interest. Principally, issuers were required to publish compliance certificates 
in conjunction with the publication of financial statements, meaning 
quarterly as a default. In some instances though, issuers were subject to 
stricter requirements. These requirements were found in three cases and 
stipulated that the issuer should provide a compliance certificate upon 
incurring new financial indebtedness, making a distribution or making a 
restricted payment. In one instance, it was stipulated that a compliance 
                                                
102 Terms and Conditions for SAS AB’s (publ) Senior Unsecured Fixed Rate SEK Notes, 
ISIN SE0005423597. 
103 Terms and Conditions for SAS AB’s (publ) Senior Unsecured Fixed Rate SEK Notes, 
ISIN SE0005423597. 
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certificate, provided quarterly, should certify compliance with the 
incurrence test.  
3.4 Closing remarks 
I conclude that divergences between covenants’ purpose and practical 
implication are not greatly deviating when it comes to how the outline of the 
covenants of the study has been drafted. This statement is supported by the 
comparison between the purposes identified in relevant literature, and how 
covenants are actually drafted in high-yield bond loan agreements. That 
statement does not however mean that there is a seamless transition in how 
covenants should be applied in practice (if their meaning is interpreted like 
anticipated), compared with the envisaged and intended purpose of why the 
same type of covenants are imposed on the borrower from the outset. More 
than a few deviating aspects were in fact identified in the course of the 
comparative test—not only due to the diligent use of game-changing carve-
outs and erratic phrasings—but also discrepancies that are not only just 
perceptible, but instead affects the function of the clause taken as a whole. 
This presses for a more in-depth analysis, especially as regards the latter.  
 
In sum, it may be affirmed that most covenants’ legal implication 
corresponds to the envisaged purposes behind employing them, should 
carve-outs be non-existent. A situation where this takes place is however 
highly unlikely, since almost no covenants were given a “default” wording 
without exceptions. This statement should nonetheless not be understood as 
being undesirable: quite the opposite. Creditors and debtors ought to be 
given space for negotiation and it may be submitted that most covenant 
clauses’ content have been subject to scrutiny and negotiation from both 
parties to the loan agreement. This asserts that the contents of the contract 
should match the will of the parties.104 On account of this, the analytic part 
will focus on the divergences that may be unwanted, rather than as a result 
of skilful negotiation; meaning discrepancies shown to occur due to 
indistinguishable or ambiguous definitions—such as the use of the term 
material adverse effect, or problems with importing covenants from foreign 
jurisdictions and applying them to an agreement that is subject to Swedish 
law, as is the case with the negative pledge-covenant. 
                                                
104 The substantial usage of carve-outs could perhaps be explained in light of the 
discrepancy of term sheet contents, compared to executed terms and conditions. That is 
however a question that is not covered by the scope of this paper.  
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4 Conclusions from the 
comparative test 
4.1 Introduction 
The comparative test between covenants’ purpose in theory and their 
practical implication in reality displayed many divergences. It is however 
quite necessary to separate the divergences that are a cause of negotiations 
between the lender and borrower, and divergences that appear to be inherent 
in certain covenant usages. For expected reasons, these divergences found in 
negative pledge-covenants and material adverse effect-terminologies will 
henceforth be the focus of the coming chapter.  
4.2 Negative pledge-covenants 
As we have learnt, a negative pledge-covenant—together with the pari 
passu-clause—have a central meaning in most loan agreements. This is 
admitted by the clause’s way of restricting the issuer’s ability to grant 
security in company assets to in order to incur additional indebtedness.  
 
A negative pledge-covenant can be used as a substitute for, as well as a 
complement to, traditional securities. By including this covenant in a loan 
agreement, the noteholders essentially ensure that the assets of the issuer 
will be distributed equally amongst the unsecured creditors upon the 
debtor’s insolvency. The value of the typical negative pledge covenant for 
the investor is however subject to doubt, due to one question that arises: can 
a third party that has accepted pledged security, in conflict with a negative 
pledge-clause, realize the security upon the debtor’s default?105 In 
ascertaining the practical legal value of a negative pledge-covenant for an 
investor, the subject ought to be of fundamental significance.  
 
To clarify the complexity of this problem, I will exemplify the situation in 
an illustrative manor; an issuer of a high-yield bond the and its noteholders 
are entered into an agreement containing a set of terms and conditions 
(“Loan agreement A”), including a negative pledge-covenant that, inter alia, 
prohibits the issuer from creating any security over any of its assets, present 
or future. Despite this, the issuer raises additional indebtedness from Bank 
A and secures this indebtedness in company assets as set out in another loan 
agreement (“Loan agreement B”) (let us also presume that the issuer was not 
hindered by a clause preventing it to raise additional financial indebtedness, 
for the sake of clarity). When the noteholders find out that the issuer has 
breached the terms and conditions of Loan agreement A, they accelerate the 
                                                
105 Compare with Gorton, Lars and Sjöman, Erik, Negativa förpliktelser och tredje män – 
särskilt om överträdelse av negative pledges i finansiella avtal, Juridisk Tidsskrift, third 
edition, 2002, p. 506 et seq. [cit. Gorton et al.]. 
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notes. This is because breaches of the terms and conditions, for example the 
negative pledge-covenant, cause an event of default of the notes under the 
loan agreement.106 The acceleration of the notes means that the agent—on 
behalf of the noteholders—declares the notes payable. From the issuer’s 
perspective this is not a very good thing; the principal derived from the bond 
issuing is most likely tied up in the business of the debtor and, as a 
consequence, assets need to be liquidated to repay the bondholders. If the 
issuer becomes insolvent as a result of this process, Bank A will have 
priority in the bankruptcy proceedings since Bank A holds security in the 
issuer’s assets in accordance with Loan Agreement B. The asset pool was 
supposed to be reserved for the noteholders as well as other unsecured 
creditors, in accord with why the negative pledge-covenant was employed in 
the first place. Since Loan Agreement B breaches Loan Agreement A, the 
noteholders want to know if Bank A have the possibility to realize the 
claim, even though they have aided in breaching Agreement A by accepting 
assets as security—that were not allowed to be pledged as security—per 
Loan Agreement B. 
 
Gorton and Sjöman has investigated this problem in their paper “Negativa 
förpliktelser och tredje män – särskilt om överträdelse av negative pledges i 
finansiella avtal”, (Eng: Negative pledges and third parties – especially 
concerning breaches of negative pledges in financial agreements). The 
background to the whole predicament originates in the distinction between 
property rights (Sw. sakrätter), and rights of obligation (Sw. 
obligationsrätter) under Swedish law. 
 
An agreement may impose positive as well as negative obligations on its 
contracting parties. Negative pledge-clauses impose a negative obligation by 
hindering the debtor from making certain undertakings, related to providing 
security over its assets to secure loans. Other examples of negative 
obligations are seen in situations dependant on loyalty and trust, such as 
non-disclosure agreements or non-competition clauses, or certain 
undertakings in loan agreements related to the disposal of company assets, 
in ways that are detrimental to the creditors.107 Examples of property rights 
are rights of ownership and rights of security, whereas rights of obligations 
typically signify the accomplishment of an obligation—positive or 
negative—such as paying an agreed amount on an agreed date.108 
Proprietary rights bind third parties, thus empowering separation rights and 
priority rights in bankruptcy. A right of obligation is a right that traditionally 
does not entail proprietary rights, and therefore, it only applies between the 
parties to the agreement, excluding any legal implications towards third 
parties.109 This is because of a standard rule of contract under Swedish law, 
limiting the scope of parties subject to it to the contracting parties (Sw: 
avtalets subjektiva begränsning).110 This principle entails that it is 
                                                
106 See supra section 3.2.1. 
107 Gorton et al., p. 506. 
108 Gorton et al., p. 506. 
109 Gorton et al., p. 504, also compare with Håstad, p. 430.  
110 Gorton et al., p. 507. 
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impossible to obligate (Sw. förpliktiga) another party besides the contracting 
party, whereas no restriction is imposed as regards the ability to entitle (Sw. 
berättiga) third parties.111 The principle of numerus clausus, meaning that it 
is not possible to create proprietary rights by means of contract, further 
limits the scope. The principle entails that if a party to an agreement is 
vested with a right that is neither by law, nor case law, acknowledged as a 
proprietary right—an agreement aimed at contractually manifesting a right 
with the same objective cannot be legally binding.112  
 
As we have learnt, the negative pledge clause (if there are no carve-outs to 
it, which there usually is) perpetrates the practical implication that the 
debtor’s assets is inflicted with a prohibition to be pledged as security for 
the raising of additional indebtedness. As such, it may be submitted that a 
negative pledge-covenant—given the principle of numerus clausus—under 
no circumstances should be able offer proprietary rights aiming to protect 
the issuer from the creditors of the issuer, compared to the protection that 
traditional security arrangements acknowledged by law can.113 
 
Aside from traditional proprietary rights under Swedish law, impediments 
may also be imposed on certain assets by means of contract. Exemplifying 
this is contractual provisions in purchase agreements aiming to establish that 
the purchased asset shall be used in accordance with certain undertakings; 
that it for example may not be disposed of, leased, or pledged as security. 
These contractual impediments are by default only applicable between the 
sphere of the contracting parties.114 Swedish case law and doctrine does 
however indicate that limited proprietary rights may be asserted to certain 
individual property, even though scholars do not entirely agree on this.115 
This is however not of material interest, nor significance, for the legal value 
of negative pledge-covenants. This has to do with the fact that these clauses 
are drafted so that they prevent the issuer from creating any security over 
any of its assets, rather than over a specific asset.116 Since a proprietary right 
needs to be tied to a specific, individually determined item in order to bind 
third party acquirers—according to the Swedish cornerstone of proprietary 
law, specialitetsprincipen as devised in NJA 1910 p. 216—negative pledge-
                                                
111 Gorton et al., p. 507. Also compare with Adlercreutz, Axel, Avtalsrätt 1, 12th edition, 
2002, p. 138 et seq. [cit. Adlercreutz]. 
112 Gorton et al., p. 507. Also compare with Håstad, p. 130. 
113 Gorton et al., p. 508. Also compare with Hessler, Henrik, Allmän sakrätt, 1973, p. 418. 
[cit. Hessler].  
114 Gorton et al. p. 508. Also compare with Hessler, p. 446. 
115 The question revolves around the ability to protect the property against a third party 
acquirer that has actual knowledge about an encumbrance that is tied to the property, and 
that is made in an agreement between the two contracting parties. Of particular interest is 
the cases NJA 1924 p. 329, NJA 1925 p. 80 and NJA 1940 p. 297. These cases ascertained 
that undertakings to pledge assets for security, which are strictly non-proprietary, have 
proprietary effect against third parties with actual knowledge of the undertakings. In light 
of how differently these cases have been interpreted by Swedish scholars Rodhe, Nial, 
Hessler and Håstad, it can hardly be appointed much legal value, according to Gorton. See 
Gorton et al., p. 508 et seq. 
116 In no instance did a negative pledge-covenant stipulate that no security was allowed to 
be created over assets that were specified, according to the study. 
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covenants appear to lack effect against third parties accepting security in 
breach of an initial negative pledge-commitment.117  
 
In conclusion, I almost entirely agree with Gorton et al. The paper is 
prominently written and very accurate in its content. Whilst the authors are 
completely correct in theory as regards the observations of the value of 
negative pledge-clauses, I think that they underestimate the implication in 
loan agreements by comparing negative pledge-covenants to letters of 
comfort and quasi-securities.118 It is however true, as Gordon et al. states, 
that the idea behind negative pledges is generally accomplished in all 
aspects—short of strictly legal. Albeit, is it possible to view the problem 
from an additional, more pragmatic angle? 
 
I claim that the effects of negative pledge-covenants in practice largely 
correspond with the reason why they are employed. That does however 
require taking a different approach to how the covenant is used, by weighing 
in how the covenant aids in imposing leverage against the borrower to 
ensure adherence to the terms and conditions of the indenture by threatening 
to accelerate the notes upon breach of the clause. The recurrent usage of 
negative pledge-covenants amongst high-yield bond terms, legal advice 
being provided by some of the most skilled banking- and finance lawyers in 
Sweden, and the general manor in which the clauses are employed, should 
support this theory. This power of negative pledges is however, as it seems, 
not relying on the force of law. Rather, on the lender’s belief that no debtor 
wants to breach the contract since this results in an event of default and 
acceleration of the notes. This ought to cause negative effects on the 
borrower than in no sense can be outweighed by the positive effects of being 
able to raise new debt from a third party by creating security upon its assets. 
Hence, negative pledges should in my opinion be seen as a very strong 
deterrent, not a quasi-security.  
4.3 Material Adverse Effect 
The presence of the seemingly vague term material adverse effect in loan 
agreements is in many ways questionable, especially considering how the 
term is (mainly) put to use: either, as an outer limit for the issuer’s disposal 
rights of company assets, or as a limiter in no-merger clauses.  
 
When considering the problem at hand, there are two ways in which to 
approach it. The first, and most difficult, is to try and establish how a 
Swedish court or arbitrator would interpret the term. Needless to say, this is 
no easy task and to reach satisfactory results one needs to look across 
jurisdictions and adopt analogies. Regardless of how well this 
                                                
117 Håstad, p. 152, compare with Gorton, p. 510. The opinion is also shared with Hessler 
and Karlgren, see Gorton et al. p. 510. Also, there may be indemnification abilities and 
possibilities for reclaims in bankruptcy (even though these possibilities are seemingly not 
supported by Swedish law), but I will not approach these subjects since I believe that they 
stretch a bit too far from the initial purpose of the negative pledge-covenant. 
118 Gorton et al. p. 521. 
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argumentation is carried out, it would be impossible to attach a definition to 
the term since it will probably always need to be seen in light of each 
specific case. The second way is to proclaim that the difficulties arising as 
regards how to interpret the term in the first place means that it does not 
serve its purpose very well. I will try and argue for why investors should try 
to limit usages of the term in loan agreements, or to require that it is 
clarified in its contents so that it is easier to apply. This argument of mine is 
held regardless of the term’s—very likely, (given the magnitude of its 
usage)—normative purpose that is exhibited by its wording. In other words, 
the ability for the concerned parties to chisel out what constitutes an MAE is 
probably not intended. This, in my opinion, causes a problem due to the 
origination of the term in two specific covenants.  
 
Firstly, in the context of: 
 
“Mergers and Demergers 
	  
a) A decision is made that any Material Group Company shall be 
demerged or merged into a company which is not a Group Company 
if such demerger or merger can be expected to have an Material 
Adverse Effect, unless the Agent has given its consent (not to be 
unreasonably withheld or delayed) in writing prior to the merger 
and/or demerger (where consent is not to be understood as a waiver 
of the rights that applicable law at the time assigns the concerned 
creditors).  
 
b) The Issuer merges with any other person, or is subject to a 
demerger, with the effect that the Issuer is not the surviving 
entity.”119 
 
And where 
 
“Material Adverse Effect means a material adverse effect on  
 
a) the business, financial condition or operations of the Group taken as 
a whole;  
b) the Issuer’s ability to perform and comply with the undertakings set 
out in Clause 14 (General Undertakings); or  
c) the validity or enforceability of the Finance Documents (including 
the ranking of the Transaction Security as set out in such Finance 
Documents).”120  
 
And secondly concerning: 
 
 
                                                
119 Terms and Conditions for Cloetta AB’s (publ) Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate 
Notes, ISIN SE0005364437. 
120 Terms and Conditions for Cloetta AB’s (publ) Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate 
Notes, ISIN SE0005364437. 
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“Disposal of Assets 
 
The Issuer shall not, and shall procure that no Material Group Company, 
make(s) a Restricted Disposal, unless such disposal is carried out at fair 
market value and on terms and conditions customary for such transaction 
and provided that it does not have a Material Adverse Effect [...]”121 
 
and where 
 
"Material Adverse Effect means a material adverse effect on 
 
a) the business, financial condition or operations of the Group taken as 
a whole; 
b) the Issuer's ability to perform and comply with the undertakings set 
out in Clause […] (General Undertakings); or 
c) the validity or enforceability of the Finance Documents.”122 
 
My arguments start with the difficulties related to the application of no-
merger clauses; identified despite of the non-prescriptive and normative 
outset of the MAE-term’s intended application. In this perspective, it may 
be affirmed that any investor would need formidable knowledge about the 
issuer’s corporation in order to fully assess whether a merger or demerger 
has resulted in a material adverse effect. Despite of the normative outset of 
the terminology and the inherent purpose in this, the term may in fact prove 
to be too vague and imprecise. It is even possible that investors would be 
required to hire external expertise to analyse whether a merger or demerger 
would have material adverse effect. A court or arbitrator would find it 
equally, if not even more, difficult. Hence, I dispute the value of clauses that 
employ material adverse effect-terms in the context of no-merger clauses by 
arguing that they confer a weak defence against unwanted actions due to the 
difficulties and costs associated with employing it. In large, the same applies 
to the value of no disposal-clauses since the investor would too be required 
to have an insight into the borrower’s business to fully ascertain whether a 
disposal has caused a material adverse effect or not. The circumstance of the 
sizeable group of investors apparent in high-yield bond indentures 
exacerbate the value of the covenants employing MAEs even more, by 
demanding greatly upon the agent to act reasonably in their interest in 
stating that a MAE has occurred. 
 
In light of these particulars, I think that investors should refrain from relying 
to severely on covenants that are trusting in MAEs’ fulfilling their purpose. 
That statement does however seem to be conversing to the belief of legal 
advisers and investors given the magnitude of the usage of the term across 
the scope of the study, and the apparent unwillingness to employ another 
                                                
121 Terms and conditions for ÅR Packaging Group AB’s (publ) maximum EUR 
115 000 000 bonds, ISIN SE0005224029. 
122 Terms and conditions for ÅR Packaging Group AB’s (publ) maximum EUR 
115 000 000 bonds, ISIN SE0005224029. 
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mechanism that serves the same purpose.123 Provided the validity of this 
observation and the probable result that the material adverse effect-
terminology is chosen for its flexibility, a few aspects as regards the clauses’ 
drafting may then be argued to be of importance for the sake of investor 
protection. This question revolves around the definition of the MAE in the 
terms and conditions; predominantly the scope of what the effect is deemed 
to be on (the example clauses above inter alia covers effects on the 
borrower’s business, financial condition, operations and ability to perform 
its general undertakings in the loan agreement)—rather than simply 
employing a narrow definition that perhaps some borrowers may desire, in 
light of the lender’s role as a creditor and not as a shareholder, thus meaning 
unconcern with anything but the debtor’s ability to service the loan 
throughout its term and repay the principal. As such, borrowers may claim 
that definitions of MAEs including measurement on the financial condition 
or operations of the group should not be necessary. A wide definition of an 
MAE is nonetheless something that is beneficial and important for lenders 
to employ, since it covers a wider scope of negative scenarios possibly 
resulting in risks of the borrower ending up in financial distress.124 Hence, I 
state that—absent the ability to remove MAEs entirely—a wide-as-possible 
scope like in the example clauses above should be insisted upon by 
investors. 
 
A second way to approach the problem of MAEs was suggested; to try and 
define what a material adverse effect means. It is however unlikely that this 
is intended, instead it would be likely that legal advisors would have made 
the term easier to define in the first place. To solve this predicament in 
theory however, guidance can be sought in the case Grupo Hotelero 
Urvasco SA v. Carey Value Added SL [2013] EWHC 1039 (Comm) (26 
April 2013) where the English High Court contemplated how to interpret a 
Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) clause. This case illustrates quite well 
how certain aspects of the requisites of “material” and “adverse” should be 
interpreted even though it concerns a change rather than an effect.  
 
 
                                                
123 Consider perhaps that the incidence of MAEs should be viewed in light of borrowers’ 
will to incorporate a term that is hard to define, and hence purposefully leads to difficult 
applications—meaning that the issue boils down to a question of leverage when negotiating 
loan agreements. This needs to be seen in the context of how vagueness can be beneficial to 
one party, and detrimental to the other, and the probable outcome of an interpretation that is 
most likely conservative rather than abrasive: in my opinion it should be harder to prove 
that a material adverse effect has not taken place, compared to that it has. 
124 Compare with Hiller, William H., and Finnegan, Cornelius T., III, Simplify Your Loan 
Agreement to Earn Your Borrower’s Goodwill, Commerical Lending Review 14, 1998-
1999. 
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4.4 Concluding remarks 
Now the comparative test is concluded, both as regards negative pledge-
covenants, material adverse effect-terms, and the remaining covenants from 
section 3.3.  
 
The results and conclusions drawn will now be concluded in the analysis, 
with the ultimate purpose to answer the questions set out in section 1.2. 
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This fifth and final chapter will conclude the paper. It will start with 
summarizing the risks that were identified throughout the course of this 
work, then discuss how these risks can be mitigated, and ultimately answer 
the theses.  
 
This chapter will also include a short discussion of the possibilities of 
incorporating covenant practices within the SSDA’s standard agreement. 
5.2 Which risks have been identified? 
Several risks of different source and proportion have been identified in the 
covenant practices within loan agreements of the Swedish high-yield bond 
sector. The ones most obvious and easily fixable are risks associated with 
limiting certain covenants’ effects by creating a rigid network of carve-outs, 
thereby limiting the apparent effect that a covenant is anticipated to have in 
its default form. This incidence of frequent usages of carve-outs and 
borrower-friendly covenants is quite noteworthy, predominantly due to the 
fact that the bonds investigated are in fact high-yield, and often unsecured. 
This means that the bonds have low ranking in the debtor’s balance sheet, 
compared to its senior financing. This riskiness should entail that creditors 
ask a lot of the debtor in terms of contractual safeguards—contradictory to 
what was just accounted for. The only answer to this question ought to be 
that investors chase yield in risker instruments, given the current macro 
economical market situation with low remuneration levels tied to safer 
investments. It may therefore be proposed that high-yield bond notes 
generally may be seen as rather attractive investments, in spite of the high 
levels of risk associated with holding them. This fact is of course not true 
across the board, but should bear some resemblance in practice. One should 
however not quickly disregard the riskiness of high-yield bond notes—a 
statement that I believe Swedish inventors would agree on. This is 
evidenced by the rather rigid network of covenants employed (even though 
carve-outs and exceptions may result in a less stringent level of protection 
than anticipated). This discussion aims to proclaim that it is safe to say—at 
least in relation to most covenants—that their contents have been 
negotiated. Unless the negotiated wordings’ implication in practice is very 
deviating from the purpose behind employing the covenant, these practices 
are not very interesting to analyse since their implication should have been 
taken into account by the investor.  
 
Regardless of the above, a few aspects of concern stand out and will 
nonetheless be accounted for. These risks were found in clauses permitting 
new financial indebtedness under basket sizes that were too great, cross-
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default- and cross-acceleration baskets disproportionate to the aggregate 
value of the notes, as well as negative pledge-covenants with too many 
carve-outs; especially concerning the ability to create securities towards 
named creditors. 
 
Of abundant interest is also the matter of risks having been identified in 
negative pledge-clauses, as well as regards covenants that rely on material 
adverse effect-terminologies. These risks are suggested to be of a different 
magnitude since it is probable that the investor did not anticipate them. The 
analysis of these two features did prove that they are in fact risks, even 
though it was argued that the general leverage created by covenants is also 
true as regards negative pledges, meaning that desired effect is still reached 
in practice—regardless of the limitation in the covenant’s applicability 
towards third parties. The same does, in my opinion, not apply to clauses 
relying heavily on material adverse effect-terms as an outer limit for their 
applicability. This conclusion was held in part by establishing that, despite 
of the non-prescriptive character of the term, its application may not be 
suitable within the context of no-merger clauses and no-disposal clauses due 
to the levels of insight into the issuing companies that is required.  
5.3 How can the risks be mitigated? 
Risks associated with carve-outs on a general level are easily avoidable, but 
would in practice require negotiation skills and leverage against the 
borrower. Provided that high-yield bonds are in fact considered to be 
attractive investments in Sweden, issuers that find presumptive investors too 
tough at the negotiating table could simply choose not to bestow upon them 
any notes. This means that great deals of leverage should be required in 
order for investors to be able to negotiate terms drastically more favourable 
for them (in practice, the indenture ought to be undersubscribed). In this 
ideal scenario where investors can afford to make demands however, they 
should strive towards omitting having too generous carve-outs in key 
covenants. This especially applies to permitted new financial indebtedness, 
which evidently may result in the debtor’s cash flows needing to compete 
when it comes to servicing the noteholders’ outstanding loan. Of material 
risk is the scenario where a debtor is permitted to incur additional financial 
indebtedness in certain specified scenarios or from certain named entities 
(especially if it means the accumulation of additional senior ranking debt), 
in combination with a basket that is too great. A few notable aspects also 
arose when analysing the cross-default- and cross-acceleration basket 
values. In that context, and of distinct concern, were basket values that were 
far too immense in relation to the notes’ aggregate value. This aspect 
quickly renders the covenant quite useless—hence making it a typical and 
central deviating factor amongst practical covenant wordings compared to a 
hypothetical purpose. As a consequence, investors should ensure that these 
basket values are kept at a minimum. Furthermore, a mechanism where 
covenants aiming to restrict disposals and distributions are dependant on the 
meeting of ratio tests of varying nature—such as the equity ratio—should be 
encouraged to prevent value stripping measures, as oppose to usages of 
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vague terms such as material adverse effect. The latter are instead argued to 
be hard to put into context—meaning that covenants whose mechanisms are 
built on the term are rather blunt instruments. Due to the unlikeliness of 
market players stepping away from MAE-usages though, investors should 
strive towards widening the term’s scope to the extent it is possible, to also 
include effects on the issuer’s business, financial conditions and operations. 
This wording is claimed to be advantageous, especially in light of the often 
unsecured and risky nature of high-yield bonds.  
 
Lastly, investors should at least to some extent be concerned about the 
proposed lack of applicability of negative pledges-covenants—i.e. their lack 
of effect outside of the contractual relation between lender and borrower in a 
strict legal sense—even though it was argued that the lenders’ leverage and 
enforcement rights provided by the loan agreement ought to create 
remarkably greater protection than a quasi-security would. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
This paper set out to answer the question of how covenants are used in 
Swedish high-yield bonds, a matter that had previously not been looked into 
from a comparative and investigative perspective. The paper has answered 
this question by presenting to the reader which covenants are most 
frequently occurring on the Swedish market, as well as their given wording. 
When knowing the wording and content of each covenant, it is possible to 
ascertain their value for the investor by analysing the effects of carve-outs 
and exceptions to their default form. Several aspects carrying risk have been 
identified throughout the course of this analysis; some directly by looking at 
the wording of the covenant, hence easily comprehended and mitigated, and 
some of more concealed nature. These latter risks became of focus since 
they were deemed to entail the most serious and unanticipated risks for 
investors looking to safeguard their capital.   
 
As the question arises whether the comparative test displays that the purpose 
of covenants in Swedish high-yield loan agreements is satisfied, the answer 
ought to be that it does so—for the most part. Aside from a few possible 
legal pitfalls associated with the usage of negative pledge-covenants and the 
inherent vagueness in material adverse effect-linked terms, my general 
conclusion is that covenant packages seem to work purposefully in practice. 
Any investor does however need to ensure that carve-outs, baskets and other 
exceptions to clauses’ applicability does not inflict too greatly on their 
protective value.  
 
Covenant usages on the Swedish market for high-yield bonds are shown to 
be rather uniform when analysing them from a wider perspective. If one 
however drills down into each clause’s wording, material divergences 
appear even though the common characteristics are shared. I conclude that 
this is something that the market needs, and hence that it is neither possible 
nor desired to strive towards standardizing templates for covenants across 
the board. There is truly an inherent problem in creating standardized 
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templates for covenants, which is evidenced by the lack of them in the 
SSDA’s standard agreement. To create uniformity within all areas of 
covenants would be difficult, but it would perhaps be possible to standardize 
templates regarding certain aspects such as basket values in proportion to 
volume circulating of the notes. It does however need to be understood that 
flexibility ought to be key, since covenants should be tailored to the specific 
needs of the borrower, and specific risks tied to the borrower’s business. 
Therefore, I find it very unlikely that a uniform covenant template will 
evolve any time soon. In the future it is possible that such templates will be 
used even though it is more likely, in my opinion, that several different 
covenant templates will be utilized depending on a number of parameters 
innate in the issuer’s business and financial strength.  
 
In conclusion it may be affirmed that the reader now should comprehend 
how covenants are used in loan agreements of Swedish high-yield bonds, by 
having taken part of the results of an empirical study that illustrates the 
wording of the most important covenants. This paper then comparatively 
analysed diverging aspects between the reasons behind employing these 
covenants and their anticipated implication in practice. Certain matters of 
importance as regards elements of risk where identified throughout this 
course of this comparison, leading to some criticizing arguments as to how 
some covenants have been drafted and some critique as to inherent 
complications in certain covenants. As regards the critique concerning the 
drafting of certain covenants, it is quite likely that content that has been 
subject to my scepticism throughout this paper has been a result of leverage 
in negotiation rather than poor drafting. The latter situation should be highly 
unlikely given the proficiency of the legal expertise employed to execute the 
loan agreements.  
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Supplement A 
The bonds that have been part of the empirical survey: 
 
Issuer   ISIN Code   
Akelius Fastigheter AB (publ) SE0004649739  
Arise Windpower AB (publ) SE0004518769  
Bactiguard Holding AB  SE0004296671  
Bayport Management Limited SE0003617216  
Bayport Management Limited 2 SE0004649713  
Bergteamet Holding  AB (publ)  SE0005364411  
Björn Borg AB (publ)  SE0004545192  
Catella AB   SE0004809630  
Cloetta AB (publ)  SE0005364437  
CLS Holding PLC  SE0003918093  
Corem Property Group AB (publ) SE0005162856  
DDM Treasury Sweden AB (publ) SE0005280831  
Estea Sverigefastigheter 2 AB SE0004867331  
Etraveli AB (publ)   SE0005393220  
Ferronordic Machines AB  SE0004020766  
MCB Finance Group PLC  SE0005100567  
MCB Treasury AB (publ)  SE0004489672  
Millicom International Cellular S.A. SE0004809663  
Millicom International Cellular S.A. SE0004809655  
Nordax Finans AB (publ)  SE0005126406  
Opus Group AB (publ)  SE0005466034  
Orc Group Holding AB (publ) SE0004872851  
PA Resources AB (publ)  SE0003652577  
PA Resources AB (publ)  SE0005392834  
Real People Investment Holdings Ltd. SE0005392560  
Rederi AB Transatlantic (publ) SE0005249299  
RusForest AB  SE0003945385  
Ruric AB   SE0003045848  
SAS AB (publ)  SE0005423597  
Scandinavian Air Ambulance Holding  SE0005249679  
Sefyr Värme AB (publ)  SE0004452902  
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB (publ) SE0004649747  
Svensk FastighetsFinansiering AB SE0004389914  
Svensk Hypotekspension Fond 1 AB SE0003428457  
Svensk Hypotekspension Fond 1 AB SE0003428465  
Trigon Agri A/S  SE0004019008  
Wihlborgs Fastigheter AB (publ)  SE0005222924  
ÅR Packaging Group AB (publ)  SE0005224029	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